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1. Introduction 
 
 In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, regulators have introduced 
stringent changes to the regulation of banks, especially by redesigning existing frameworks for 
regulatory capital requirements and by tightening the supervision of the so called systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs)
1
. There is a rapidly growing literature analyzing various 
specific elements of the Basel III capital requirements
2
 (Cecchetti (2015), Dermine (2015), 
Repullo and Suarez (2013)) as well as their potential consequences for bank performance 
(Giordana and Schumacher (2012), Berger and Bouwman (2013), Admati et al. (2010)), bank risk-
taking (Kiema and Jokivuolle (2014), Hamadi (2016)), economic and financial stability (Angelini 
et al. (2014), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016), Farhi and Tirole (2012), Acharya and Thakor 
(2016), Hanson et al. (2011), Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009)), and credit supply (e.g. 
Cosimano and Hakura (2011), Jimenez et al. (2017), De Jonghe et al. (2016), Kok and Schepens 
(2013), Francis and Osborne (2012), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)).  
 While this first stream of papers is interested in the equilibrium implications of capital 
requirements, there is another stream that investigates the dynamics of bank capital towards a new 
equilibrium. This other stream of research has analyzed how quickly banks can adjust their capital 
ratios and which mechanisms they can resort to (see e.g., Berger et al. (2008), Memmel and 
Raupach (2010), Öztekin and Flannery (2012), Lepetit et al. (2015), De Jonghe and Öztekin 
(2015), Cohen and Scatigna (2016)).  
 We link these two strands of literature and aim to fill two specific gaps in the existing 
literature.  First of all, we address the following questions: Are there differences in adjustment 
mechanisms and adjustment speed for leverage vis-à-vis regulatory capital? Might they conflict? 
Although banks cannot set their desired leverage ratio ignoring the restrictions imposed by 
regulatory ratios, how and how quickly they adjust to leverage and regulatory ratios can differ 
                                                          
1 
According to the definition of the Financial Stability Board, systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are 
financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic 
interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. 
2
 Regarding capital requirements, the most important innovations in Basel III are the introduction of a leverage 
requirement (next to risk-weighted capital requirements), a capital surcharge for systemically important banks and the 
introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer. The imposed changes aspire to achieve financial stability by 
increasing the resilience of banks to shocks and by forcing them to internalize systemic externalities. 
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because of conflicting pressures from shareholders and regulators. Second, while this first step 
results in unconditional, homogenous results describing average bank behavior, we subsequently 
differentiate between SIFI banks and non-SIFI banks, given the new regulatory and supervisory 
focus on the two groups. We analyze, both for leverage and risk-weighted capital ratios, whether 
systemically important financial institutions behave differently in terms of adjustment mechanisms 
and adjustment speed.  
 In the first part of the analysis, we focus on differences in adjustments of a leverage ratio, 
i.e. the equity-to-total (unweighted) asset ratio, and two regulatory capital ratios (Tier 1 capital 
over risk-weighted assets and total capital over risk-weighted assets) for OECD banks. We follow 
the literature and estimate a partial adjustment model of bank capital towards a bank-specific and 
time-varying optimal capital ratio (see e.g. Berger et al., (2008), Memmel and Raupach (2010), 
Öztekin and Flannery (2012), Lepetit et al. (2015), De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015)). The partial 
adjustment model assumes that banks do have a target
3
 (or optimal) capital ratio, but that there 
might be frictions (such as adjustment costs) that prevent them from instantaneously adjusting 
towards the target. Hence, at each point in time, the actual capital ratio is a weighted average of 
the lagged capital ratio and the target capital ratio, where the weight is an indication of the 
magnitude of the frictions. It is ex-ante unclear whether the speed of adjustment should be higher 
for the regulatory capital ratios versus the leverage ratio. On the one hand, one could expect a 
faster adjustment for the Tier 1 and Total Capital ratio than for the leverage ratio given the 
regulatory focus on these measures. On the other hand, the opposite could also be found because 
the set of adjustment mechanisms is smaller for the regulatory capital ratios vis-à-vis the leverage 
ratio, as not all types of equity count and because assets vary in risk weight. For example, 
government bonds (of OECD countries) are securities that are easily adjustable, but have a zero risk-
weight. They could help to adjust the leverage ratio, but not the regulatory capital ratios. 
Our findings show that banks are more flexible and faster in adjusting the common equity 
capital ratio than regulatory capital ratios. More specifically, in our sample of listed OECD banks 
                                                          
3 It is important to emphasize that, for both questions, we analyze the dynamics in banks’ capital adjustment 
(mechanisms and speed) towards a bank-specific and time-varying optimal capital ratio. Such bank-specific and time-
varying optimal capital ratios are determined by the regulatory minimum as well as banks’ desire to hold a buffer over 
the minimum capital requirements. Both the requirement and the buffer are time-varying and bank-specific. Moreover, 
both cannot be disentangled as information on the former is not publicly available since regulators can use Pillar 2 
requirements to impose bank-specific and time-varying capital requirements. However, these requirements are 
typically communicated privately to the bank and they are confidential. 
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over the 2001-2012 period, the speed of adjustment for the non-weighted equity-to-asset capital 
ratio structure is 0.44, which is larger than the one for the Tier 1 capital ratio, 0.29, and the total 
capital ratio, 0.33. In economic terms, these speeds of adjustment correspond with half-lives of 
1.18, 2.07 and 1.74 years, respectively. The half-life is computed as log(0.5)/log(1- speed of 
adjustment) and is equal to the time required for banks to halve the gap between their actual 
capital ratio and their target.   
To understand better why the speeds of adjustment differ, we subsequently investigate how 
banks manage adjustments towards their targets. The estimation procedure allows us to back out 
the estimated target capital ratio and hence also the gap between the target and the actual capital 
ratio. We investigate growth rates in various assets classes, liability categories and types of equity, 
according to the sign of the gap for both the leverage and regulatory capital ratios. Facing an 
opportunity cost, overcapitalized (underleveraged) banks have no incentives to remain above their 
targeted capital ratio, i.e. hold a capital surplus over their target. Therefore, bank managers make 
proactive efforts to converge to their target by reducing their capital levels. For all capital 
specifications, we find that banks lever up by expanding assets, through an unrestrictive lending 
policy and risk-taking preferences, increasing liabilities both with long-term and short-term 
borrowings (except for the leverage ratio) and lessening equity growth, both internally (smaller 
amount of retained earnings) and externally (equity repurchasing and/or less equity issues). In 
contrast, when banks have a capital shortfall with comparison to their target, we find that 
undercapitalized banks de-lever by an aggressive growth reduction in all its subcomponents; i.e. 
loans and risk-weighted assets, but at the same time also raise capital externally. 
 
 In the second part of the analysis, we investigate whether or not systemically important 
financial institutions behave differently in terms of capital structure adjustments. Although SIFIs 
and large banking groups are subject to prudential regulations and considerable research has 
pointed out their characteristics and performance (see e.g. Bertay et al. (2013), Barth and Schnabel 
(2013), Laeven et al. (2015)), how they manage their capital structure and rebalance to converge to 
their optimal capital levels remains an open question with important policy implications. Indeed, 
SIFIs could behave very differently. On the one hand, because they enjoy favorable treatment from 
financial markets (higher debt ratings, lower interest rates) due to their favored access to 
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government safety nets and subsidies, SIFIs might adjust their capital structure more quickly and 
more frequently. On the other hand, SIFIs might not weigh the need to adjust quickly if they 
expect public support and bailout or because their complexity and opacity make it costlier for them 
to raise external capital.  
Combining the insights from Bertay et al. (2013) and Barth and Schnabel (2013), we focus 
on four distinguishing aspects of SIFIs, which are their absolute size (natural log of total assets), 
their relative size (total assets over GDP), their systemic risk contributions (delta Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR)) and systemic risk exposures (Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES)). 
SIFIs are more likely to care about their sensitivity to a sudden market shortfall than to how much 
their operations might jeopardize the financial system in times of crisis. Nevertheless, regulatory 
scrutiny could also be effective in pushing SIFIs to internalize the threat that they pose on the 
system. We also construct a systemic risk index based on the quintiles of such indicators. We find 
that systemically important banks adjust slower than other banks to their target leverage ratios but 
quicker to their regulatory target ratios. When we dig into the four aspects that define SIFIs, we 
find that these opposite findings on the leverage ratio and regulatory ratio are explained by the 
differential impact that size and systemic risk have. Larger banks adjust slower and this effect 
dominates for the leverage ratio, whereas systemically riskier banks adjust faster and more so their 
regulatory capital ratios. 
Moreover, our results suggest that SIFIs might be more reluctant to change their capital base by 
either issuing or repurchasing equity and prefer sharper downsizing or faster expansion. Any 
unexpected need for banks to raise capital ratios might therefore be more harmful for firms and 
households who are clients of such large institutions. To the extent that SIFIs account for a large 
portion of a banking industry (through a larger market share) the negative impact on the economy 
as a whole could also be more important.  
 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents information on the sample 
construction and variables of interest, in particular the various concepts of capital and the 
measures of (systemic) size and systemic risk. In Section 3, we examine and contrast the 
adjustment speed and adjustment mechanisms for various concepts of bank capital. Analyzing how 
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and how quick SIFIs adjust their balance sheet in response to deviations between the actual capital 
ratio and the optimal capital ratio is performed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data: sample and variables 
2.1. Sample selection 
 We conduct the analysis on a sample of listed banks headquartered in any of the OECD 
countries and analyze the 2001-2012 period
4
. For these banks, we obtain accounting and market 
data from various sources. We retrieve bank stock price information and other market data from 
Bloomberg. We obtain bank-level accounting data from Thomsen-Reuters Advanced Analytics 
and Bloomberg. We collect macroeconomic data from the OECD Metadata stats. Starting from the 
matched accounting and market data, we further drop banks with illiquid stocks, that is banks with 
infrequently traded stocks and low variability in stock prices (we disregard a stock if daily returns 
are zero over five rolling consecutive days or if more than 70% of the daily returns over the period 
are non-zero returns). Information on the sample composition by country and by year can be found 
in panel A and B of Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 We end up with an unbalanced panel dataset of 554 banks, from the 26 major advanced 
OECD countries. It consists of 407 U.S. banks and 147 non-U.S. banks, among which 112 are 
European (from 22 countries) and 22 are Japanfese.  Although we only consider publicly-traded 
OECD banks, our sample conveniently represents the U.S., euro area and Japanese banking 
sectors. The listed banks included in our sample account for approximately 73%, 52% and 31% of 
the total assets of all U.S., euro zone and Japanese banks recorded in BSI/Bloomberg statistics, 
respectively.  
 
2.2. Bank capital, size and systemic risk 
                                                          
4
 We end the sample period in 2012 in order to avoid interference with the implementation of the Basel III regulations 
(starting from 2013) that among other things introduced a leverage ratio as well as capital surcharges for systemically 
important banks. Doing so, we can study how banks treat regulatory capital ratios differently from plain leverage 
ratios in the absence of regulation on the latter. Moreover, we are able to study differential behavior by SIFIs and 
other banks in a period where the proposed methodologies for identifying G-SIFIs were not yet published for public 
consultation. These were published in January 2014. 
6 
 
 We focus on two types of capital measures. We focus on two regulatory capital ratios by 
using the Tier1 regulatory capital ratio, defined as Tier 1 equity over total risk-weighted assets 
(Tier1RWA hereafter) and the Total Capital ratio, defined as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 equity to 
total risk-weighted assets. We also consider the average non-weighted common equity ratio 
(leverage ratio), defined as common equity over total non-weighted assets. The latter is based on 
cruder risk-exposure, which may be more relevant for stock market participants or debt holders 
whom may view risk weights as highly opaque and uninformative (Blum, 2008).  
 In our analysis, we devote special attention to Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs, for a definition see footntote 4). A first approach to capture whether banks are systemically 
important is assessing their size. Bertay et al. (2013) suggest the use of two proxies of systemic 
size, namely a bank’s absolute size, defined as the logarithm of a bank’s total assets, as well as a 
bank’s relative size, defined as a bank’s total assets over gross domestic product (GDP). Barth and 
Schnabel (2013) argue and document that bank size (be it absolute or relative) is not a sufficient 
measure of systemic risk because it neglects aspects such as interconnectedness, correlation, and 
the economic context. They suggest the use of market-based measures of systemic importance, 
such as the delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR, by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)), 
which captures the contribution to system wide risk of an individual bank, or a measure of an 
individual bank’s systemic risk vulnerability/exposure to system wide distress such as the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES, see Acharya et al. 2016 and Brownlees and Engle, 2012). The 
difference between the two concepts is the directionality. The former assesses the extent to which 
distress at a bank contributes to system-wide stress, whereas the latter identifies the extent to 
which a bank’s stock will lose value when there is a systemic event. The MES and ∆CovaR will 
typically be positive (we use the opposite of returns such that losses are expressed with a positive 
sign) and higher values correspond to larger systemic risk exposures and contributions. More 
information on the construction of these measures is in appendix A1 and the papers referenced 
therein.  
 We also construct a composite SIFI-index that covers in an equally-weighted way these 
four dimensions of systemic importance: a proxy of absolute size, systemic size, systemic 
exposure and contagion risk. More specifically, for each of the four metrics, we divide the sample 
in quintiles and give a score of one to banks in the lowest quintile, two in the second quintile and 
so on, with five for the highest. Subsequently, we take the sum of the scores associated to each of 
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these quintiles of the four size or risk metrics to obtain an index that ranges from four to twenty, 
with the highest value representing the highest level of systemic importance that an individual 
bank can exhibit. This equally-weighted index of four characteristics provides a summary statistic 
of systemic importance because it combines several measures of systemic risk and size in one 
metric. 
 Panel A of Table 2 reports definitions, sources and summary statistics on the bank-level 
capital ratios and the control variables we use in our estimations. All variables are winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1 percent level to eliminate the adverse effects of outliers and misreported data. 
The average leverage, Tier1RWA and Total Capital ratios are 9.3%, 11.7% and 14.1%, 
respectively. Furthermore, the fifth percentile of the Tier1RWA and Total Capital ratio suggests 
that regulatory capital ratios are well above the Pillar 1 minimum requirement for the majority of 
banks throughout the sample period.  
 In panel A, we also provide descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables we use to 
examine the determinants of banks’ target capital ratios. Overall, across the sample period and 
countries, we observe that the average bank has low credit risk (average loan loss provisions to 
total loans of 0.7%), is strongly reliant on retail market funding (89.7%), is reasonably liquid as 
indicated by the ratio of net loans to total deposits (108.9%), has a low amount of fixed assets 
(1.6%), is moderately diversified in terms of assets (average loans to assets is 69%) and revenue 
(average non-interest income share is 19.6%). In terms of insolvency risk (bank default risk) and 
riskiness of assets, the average bank is relatively sound (average market-based Z-score is 3.43) but 
allocates a large fraction of its assets to high risk-weight assets (average risk-weighted asset ratio 
is 73.8%). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 Panel B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of systemic risk and size measures at the 
individual bank level for the full sample period. The mean of the natural logarithm of total book 
assets is 8.15 and the median is 7.42 (which correspond to about $3 billion and $2 billion 
respectively). Although we only consider publicly traded OECD banks, our sample still exhibits 
considerable size heterogeneity across banks. This is clear from the standard deviation (2.311) and 
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the range between the 5
th
 percentile and the 95
th
 percentile [5.585 to 13.010]. The relative bank 
size measure confirms the heterogeneity across banks and the presence of large banks relative to a 
country’s economic importance. For example, relative size varies between 0.00% (fifth percentile) 
and 51.8% (95
th
 percentile) out of the domestic GDP, with a standard deviation of 19.7%. The 
summary statistics also reveal that banks vary in terms of systemic importance. The average values 
of MES and ∆CoVaR are 1.69% and 1.56% but the systemic risk measures are disperse with 
standard deviations of 1.91% and 1.74%, respectively. 
Table 3 presents pairwise correlations among all variables at the bank level. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3. Leverage versus regulatory capital requirements: dynamic adjustment mechanisms 
3.1. Inferring adjustment speeds and implied targets: a partial adjustment model 
In a frictionless world, banks would always maintain their target capital ratio. However, if 
adjustment costs are significant, the bank’s decision to adjust its capital structure depends on the 
trade-off between the adjustment costs and the costs of operating with suboptimal leverage 
(Flannery and Rangan (2006), Flannery and Hankins (2013)). To allow for sluggish adjustment, it 
has become common practice in the empirical (corporate and bank) capital structure literature to 
model leverage using a partial adjustment framework (see e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Lemmon et al. (2008), Gropp and Heider (2010), De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and Lepetit et al. 
(2015)). In a partial adjustment model, a bank’s current capital ratio, Kij,t, is a weighted average 
(with weight λ ϵ [0,1]) of its target capital ratio, Kij,t
∗ , and the previous period’s capital ratio, 
Kij,t−1, as well as a random shock, εij,t: 
 
(1) Kij,t = λKij,t
∗ + (1 − λ)Kij,t−1 + εij,t 
where ij,t indicates bank i from country j in year t. Each year, the typical bank closes a 
proportion λ  of the gap between its actual and target capital levels. The smaller the lambda, the 
more rigid bank capital is, and the longer it takes for a bank to return to its target after a shock to 
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bank capital. Thus, we can interpret λ as the speed of adjustment and its complement (1 − λ) as 
the portion of capital that is inertial.  
 
Banks’ target capital ratio, Kij,t
∗ ,  is unobserved and is not necessarily constant over time. It 
consists of two building blocks: a linear combination of observed (lagged, hence time t−1) bank 
and country characteristics, Xij,t−1, as well as bank and time fixed effects. 
 
(1) Kij,t
∗ = βXij,t−1 + vt + ui 
For the set of bank characteristics we build on Gropp and Heider (2010) who show that 
standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to banks. These 
determinants and their relation to (bank) capital are based on departures from the Modigliani-
Miller irrelevance proposition because of market imperfections and highlighted by various 
corporate finance theories (see Harris and Raviv, 1991 and Frank and Goyal, 2008, for surveys). 
We therefore include proxies for bank size (diversification benefits and cost of external finance), 
bank profitability (pecking order theory), overall risk (trade-off theory), fixed assets (collateral) 
and non-interest income (growth opportunities). In addition, we follow Berger et al. (2012) and 
include various proxies for exposures to counterparty risk (retail funding and loan to assets). A 
greater reliance on insured retail deposits should reduce pressure from counterparties to hold more 
capital. Business borrowers prefer well-capitalized lenders because borrower–lender relationships 
are costly to replace if the lender fails. There is ex-ante no theoretical or empirical guidance to 
decide on altering the set of factors for the leverage ratio vis-à-vis the regulatory capital ratios. 
Berger et al. (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010), for example, also examine both leverage and 
regulatory capital ratios and do not differentiate between the set of explanatory variables for both 
types of capital ratios. Therefore, we also use the same set of factors for each capital ratio.
5
 
 
                                                          
5
 The specific ratios that we include are: bank absolute size (natural logarithm of total assets), bank profitability 
(return on assets), bank credit risk (loan loss provisions to net loans), retail funding (customer deposits to total 
funding), liquidity ratio (net loans to total assets). We also include the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, a 
diversification proxy (non-interest income to total income), a bank efficiency proxy (non-interest expense to total 
income), a ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets and a market-based Z-score. Subsets of these are also used in 
other papers (Lepetit et al. (2015), Francis and Osborne (2012), Lemmon et al. (2008), Flannery and and Rangan 
(2006)). 
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 We also account for two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: vt is a vector of year fixed 
effects. ui is a vector of bank fixed effects (which subsume country fixed effects) and capture 
unobserved heterogeneity such as quality of management, governance, risk preference and the mix 
of markets in which the bank operates. The inclusion of bank (or firm) fixed effects in capital 
structure regressions is econometrically and economically important. Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Lemmon et al. (2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Gropp and Heider (2010) advocate the 
importance of including bank (or firm) dummies for an unbiased estimation of targets. They have 
also shown that capital ratios tend to fluctuate around a bank specific time-invariant parameter, 
which can be viewed as a long-term target. In fact, De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) report for a 
sample of worldwide banks that the fraction of the total variation in banks’ capital ratios due to 
time-invariant bank characteristics (bank fixed effects) is 85%. This is similar to what is found for 
US non-financial firms by Lemmon et al. (2008) and for US and European banks by Gropp and 
Heider (2010). Hence, an extremely important component of a bank’s leverage and regulatory 
target capital ratios is thus a bank fixed effect.  
 
Substituting the equation of target leverage, equation (2), in equation (1) yields the 
following specification:  
 
(2) Kij,t = λ(βXij,t−1 + vt + ui) + (1 − λ)Kij,t−1 + εij,t. 
 In the presence of a lagged dependent variable and a short panel, using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or a standard fixed effects model would yield biased estimates of the adjustment 
speed. Therefore, following Flannery and Hankins (2013), we estimate equation (3) using Blundell 
and Bond's (1998) generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. 
 
 We estimate the partial adjustment model of equation (3) separately for each of the three 
alternative capital ratios: Leverage, Tier1RWA and Total capital. The results are reported in Table 
4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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 We focus the description of the results on the variable of interest, which is the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable.6
,7 The estimated adjustment speeds (𝜆, Eq. (3)) are significant 
and quite different for the three capital ratio models. The speed of adjustment for the non-weighted 
equity-to-asset capital ratio structure is 0.444 (=1–0.556, where 0.556 is the coefficient of the 
lagged equity-to-asset reported in the first column). This speeds of adjustment is similar to those of 
European banks (0.34, Lepetit, et al., 2015), a sample of banks in the U.S. and 15 European 
countries (0.47, Gropp and Heider, 2010), and large U.S. banks (0.40, Berger et al., 2008). 
 
The adjustment speed for the regulatory capital ratios is lower, namely 0.285 (1-0.715, column 2) 
for the Tier 1 RWA ratio and 0.328 (1-0.672, column 3) for the total capital ratio. This implies that 
adjustment is partial for each of the capital ratios, but faster when banks are closing the equity-to-
asset ratio deviation during the next period t, than when they are closing the two regulatory capital 
deviations (columns 2 and 3). Another informative metric, which provides economic meaning to 
the estimated parameters, is the half-life. The half-life provides an indication of the time required 
for banks to halve the gap between their actual capital ratio and their target. The estimated 
adjustment speeds for the leverage, Tier1 RWA and total capital ratios deviations correspond with 
half-lives of 1.18, 2.07 and 1.74 years, respectively. The results highlight that banks are slightly 
more concerned about readjusting quickly towards optimal leverage ratios compared to the speed 
to adjust towards optimal regulatory capital. This finding can be rationalized by at least two 
arguments. On the one hand, it could indicate that deviations from optimal leverage ratios are 
more costly for bank shareholders (as the target capital should be chosen such to maximize bank 
value) than deviations from regulatory capital. On the other hand, it could also be created by 
differences in adjustment costs and the range of adjustment mechanism that can be used. All else 
equal, banks have more (and less costly) options in asset adjustments that affect non-risk weighted 
                                                          
6
 For each model, we also report the coefficient estimates and the significance levels of bank-specific drivers of the 
target capital ratios. Smaller banks, banks with more credit risk and banks with more asset diversification (less loans) 
hold higher capital ratios. Besides, less liquid banks and banks with more retail funding have a higher equity-to-target 
ratio, but not higher regulatory capital ratios. Nor the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets neither the Z-score 
enter significantly, likely because of the high correlation with other bank characteristics. However, we do include 
them as they are important theoretical drivers of target leverage (trade-off theory) and because they are important for 
obtaining accurate speed of adjustment estimates. 
7
 At the bottom of panel A of Table 4, we report test statistics documenting the validity of the instruments. In 
particular, two crucial tests are required. Using the Hansen J test (test of exogeneity of the instruments), we cannot 
reject the null of joint validity of all GMM instruments (lagged values); we hence confirm the validity of the 
instruments. We also use the Arellano and Bond AR(2) test, and confirm the absence of second order serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
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assets than risk-weighted assets. For example, government bonds (of OECD countries) are 
securities that are easily adjustable, but have a zero risk-weight. They could help to adjust the 
leverage ratio, but not the regulatory capital ratios. 
 
3.2. Balance sheet adjustment mechanisms 
 In this section, we investigate how banks adjust their capital structure to close their 
deviation (gap) from the target. To do that, we use the following procedure. Based on the 
estimated vector of coefficients ?̂? from equation (3) we can compute fitted time-varying target 
capital ratios for each individual bank, 𝐾 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
∗̂ . Subsequently, we compute the time-varying capital 
deviation for bank i at time t-1, hereinafter called “the gap”, and defined as 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑗,𝑡−1= ?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ −
𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. Therefore, according to equation (3), the bank fixed effects are part of these estimated 
targets and gaps. If banks make adjustments when there is a gap, then these adjustments should be 
reflected in their observed balance sheet transactions. We follow the approach of De Jonghe and 
Öztekin (2015) and evaluate the percentage growth rates in various balance sheet components for 
three quintiles of the gap (first, middle and fifth). To do this, we first allocate banks to quintiles 
based on their gap at the end of year. Subsequently, we compute the yearly change in the relevant 
variable in the following year. We then average these growth rates across all bank-year 
observations in that quintile.  
 In a first step, we analyze the balance sheet adjustments for each capital ratio separately 
(subsection 3.2.1). These results are reported in Table 5. In a second step (subsection 3.2.2), we 
examine balance sheet adjustments in situations where the gap of the leverage ratio and Tier 1 
RWA ratio have similar or opposite signs, yielding four cases; (i) both signal overcapitalization, 
(ii) both signal undercapitalization, (3) overcapitalized leverage, but undercapitalized regulatory, 
and (4) undercapitalized leverage, but overcapitalized regulatory. 
 
3.2.1. Balance sheet adjustments following a leverage or regulatory capital gap 
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 Table 5 presents the average growth rates of the main balance sheet items for banks 
allocated to the first quintile (i.e. most overcapitalized/underleveraged banks), the third quintile 
(i.e. banks with a negligible gap) and the fifth quintile (i.e. most undercapitalized/overleveraged 
banks) based on their gap at the end of year. For each capital ratio, we report the p-values of 
difference in means tests using the third quintile as benchmark. The p-values are obtained by a 
bootstrap procedure using 500 replications to correct for the estimated nature of banks’ target 
capital ratio (see Pagan, 1984). This bootstrap approach has become common practice in the 
empirical literature using partial adjustment models for corporate capital structure (see e.g., 
Faulkender et al., 2012; Çolak et al., 2018). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 First, with respect to the leverage ratio, overcapitalized (underleveraged) banks (Q1) have a 
negative and significant change in leverage ratio compared with the change rate of the third 
quintile (-2.19% vs. 0.07%), implying that banks reduce their capital ratio to reach their target 
capital level. In fact, facing an opportunity cost, banks have no incentives to remain above their 
targeted leverage ratio. Therefore, bank managers make proactive efforts to lever up so to 
converge to their target and reduce the ongoing costs of capital surplus accordingly. To achieve a 
negative capital growth, our results show for a global sample of banks that they significantly 
expand their asset growth (21.78% vs. 8.19%), debt growth (10.43% vs. 8.17%), while equity 
growth is significantly slowed down (4.37% vs. 8.89%) always compared to the growth rates in 
the third quintile (i.e. when the gap between actual and target capital is negligible). Analyzing the 
mechanisms through which those banks lever up, the results indicate that underleveraged banks 
progress by increasing loans (6.25%) and to a smaller (economic) extent also long-term debt 
(1.87%). We note that the average loan growth and riskier assets are not economically 
significantly different with respect to the growth rate of the third quintile (5.75% and 5.43%, 
respectively). In the same line, banks having a capital surplus shrink their internal funding, the 
growth in bank retained earnings is roughly one (1.09%), and the external funding (Tier1) growth 
is substantially lowered (4.79% vis-à-vis 8.60%). Such results indicate that banks tend to lever up 
by engaging more in risky activities, being financed more with long-term debt, but without 
engaging any significant change in their loan policy or reduction in the capital level. 
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 In contrast, for undercapitalized (overleveraged) banks (Q5), results show that the change 
in leverage ratio is significantly larger (2.08% vs. 0.07%) than the third quintile, implying that 
bank managers also actively rebalance their capital ratios to revert to their targeted leverage when 
they are undercapitalized. To that extent, facing regulatory and market constraints, banks with a 
capital shortfall are more prone to deleverage in order to close the gap and get to their optimal 
target. More specifically, results for those undercapitalized banks show that the average asset 
expansion is significantly negative (-7.69% vs. 8.19%) and the average debt growth is significantly 
lower (4.73% vs. 8.17%), while the average equity growth is not significantly higher than the 
growth rate of the benchmark. Not surprisingly, this translates into a rationalized capital 
adjustment for banks to reach their leverage capital target, only by reducing assets rather than 
injecting external equity which is costly because of frictions and governance problems.  
 On the whole, what would actually pose a problem to the real economy is if lending falls 
when banks are undercapitalized but does not actually increase when they are overcapitalized. We 
notice that the average growth of loans (2.87% vs. 5.75%) and riskier assets (4.41% vs. 5.43%) are 
significantly lower than the benchmark. Indeed, deleveraging is achieved by downsizing (selling 
assets), restricting loan policy (reducing lending vis-à-vis a lower amount of debt) and lowering 
risk-weighted assets (substituting riskier assets for safer ones). 
 
 Second, with respect to regulatory capital ratio (Tier1RWA), overcapitalized banks  (Q1) 
have a negative growth in the Tier1 capital ratio which is significantly different from the change 
rate in the third quintile of the gap (-0.97% vs. 0.18%). Hence, we inspect growth rates of 
adjustment mechanisms that lead these banks to reduce their capital surplus to converge to their 
optimal regulatory level. Findings show that banks allocated in this quantile lever up by a large 
and significant increase of their asset growth (12.62% vs. 8.02%), debt growth (11.35% vs. 
8.40%), while their equity growth is significantly lower (5.96% vs. 8.89%) compared to the 
growth rates of the benchmark. Thus, overcapitalized banks proceed by significantly altering all 
the subcomponents of the balance sheet with regards to the benchmark. This translates into an 
expansionary growth rate (relative to Q3) in loans (7.92%), risky assets (9.40%) and long-term 
debt (1.74%); and a slow-down in internal capital (1.53%) and external capital (4.19%) growth 
relative to banks in the middle quintile of the regulatory gap distribution. Therefore, a Tier1 capital 
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surplus leads banks to lever up by combinations of an asset expansion strategy, risk-taking 
activities, an aggressive lending policy, long and short-term debt financing policies and a slower 
equity growth but without engaging any reduction in the capital level. 
 Concerning the regulatory undercapitalized banks (Q1), the results show that their Tier 1 
regulatory capital change is significantly higher (1.23%) than the change rate of the banks in the 
third quintile (0.18%). Accordingly, banks are expected to increase their regulatory capital, so to 
reach their internal regulatory capital target and to comply with capital requirements. They 
proceed by significantly shrinking asset growth (1.95% vs. 8.02%) and debt growth (4.78% vs. 
8.40%) compared with growth rates of the benchmark, and only a moderate increase in the growth 
rate of equity (p-value of 0.11). Based on these results, we then analyze the key mechanisms 
through which these banks de-lever and rebalance their capital structure. Similarly, we find that 
these banks react actively by significantly altering all the subcomponents of the balance sheet, 
with regards to the benchmark. Results show that the loan growth (2.17%), risky asset growth 
(1.83%), long-term debt (0.26%) and short-term debts (-0.68%) are significantly lower than the 
growth rates of the benchmark (Q3), while the external capital growth (12.28%) is significantly 
larger than the benchmark (Q3). Thus, facing a regulatory capital shortfall, deleveraging takes 
place by injecting external capital (equity issues), but not by using internal capital (earnings 
retention). Deleveraging is also achieved by downsizing, tightening lending policy (reducing 
lending vis-à-vis a lower amount of debt), selling risky assets and reducing long and short-term 
financing (selling debts). In the rightmost panel, we also show the adjustment mechanisms for the 
total capital ratio. They are by and large similar to the ones of the Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio 
(if anything, we find stronger significant differences) and are for the sake of space not discussed 
here.  
Finally, the results and capital management patterns of the total capital ratio are unreported but are 
similar to the ones discussed above for the Tier1RWA regulatory capital ratio. 
 
3.2.2. Balance sheet adjustments: joint stance of the leverage and regulatory gap 
 As the leverage ratio and regulatory capital ratios share aspects both in the numerator and 
the denominator it is likely that banks do not treat them independently. We therefore now turn to 
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an analysis of balance sheet adjustments when examining the joint stance of the leverage gap and 
the regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets) gap.  The results are reported in 
Table 6. The four blocks of columns correspond with the situations where (i) both signal 
overcapitalization, (ii) both signal undercapitalization, (iii) overcapitalized leverage ratio, but 
undercapitalized regulatory ratio, and (iv) undercapitalized leverage ratio, but overcapitalized 
regulatory ratio. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 Table 6 shows that when both capital ratios show overcapitalization (Group 1), banks’ 
equity growth is significantly lower, while asset growth and debt growth are significantly larger 
than when both capital ratios show undercapitalization (Group 2). In line with previous results, 
overcapitalized banks mainly lever up by expanding all assets and liabilities items, loans (7.60%), 
risky asset (8.28%), long-term debt (1.97%) and short-term debt (0.86%), which are statistically 
larger than the growth rates of the group of undercapitalized banks. In contrast, deleveraging for 
undercapitalized banks (Group 2) is more likely achieved by external capital (10.81%) and earning 
retention (3.07%), which are statistically larger than the growth rates of the group of 
overcapitalized banks (column 5). 
 Now, we investigate the main disparities between these two groups of banks with two other 
groups that are regulatory overcapitalized but undercapitalized with regards to the leverage ratio, 
or vice-versa (Groups 3 and 4). Test results for equality of means test are reported in the rightmost 
panel (columns 6 to 10). First, we explore differences with regards to Group 1. Underleveraged but 
regulatory undercapitalized banks (Group 3) have a significantly smaller asset growth compared to 
Group 1, and this is true for all their subcomponents (loans and risky assets) and liabilities growth 
(only short-term debt) compared to the growth rates of the overcapitalized banks (Group 1). 
However, in economic terms, we especially notice differences in the adjustments via loan growth 
and risk-weighted assets. Banks in Group 3 increase leverage mainly by expanding assets with low 
risk-weights. Regarding equity growth, their external capital growth is significantly larger 
compared to the growth rate of banks in Group 1. However, although the non-significant lower 
growth of earnings retention (1.31% vs. 1.72%) of banks in Group 3 (with regards to Group 1), the 
growth of equity remains significant. Thus, to increase their regulatory capital, besides raising 
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more external capital and decreasing risky assets, banks in Group 3 restrict their lending and long- 
and short-term financing policies.  
However, capital management of the banks in Group 4 (overleveraged but regulatory 
overcapitalized) differ from those in Groups 1 and 3. They are overleveraged, but regulatory 
overcapitalized (with respect to their target). Compared to underleveraged banks, their assets grow 
much less quickly and relatively speaking they rely more on earnings retention than external 
capital growth. Most strikingly is that the growth in net loans and risk-weighted assets is of similar 
magnitude in group 1 and 4, even though total asset growth in group 4 is much smaller compared 
to growth in group 1. Hence, when they are regulatory overcapitalized, but also overlevered, they 
will raise equity internally and most of the asset growth will be realized via high risk-weight 
assets. 
 In sum, this analysis provides interesting insights in the mechanisms and the relative 
dominance of leverage vis-à-vis risk-weighted capital ratios. The sign of the leverage and risk-
weighted capital ratio gap determines whether equity is adjusted via earnings retention (leverage 
dominates regulatory capital) or externally raised equity (regulatory stance matters). Moreover, it 
also determines whether asset side adjustments are done via loans and risky assets (regulatory gap 
matters), versus safer assets with a lower risk weight (such as securities).  
 
4. Bank capital adjustments: are SIFIs different? 
The adjustment speed depends on the trade-off between the costs (or the benefits) of being 
off the capital target and the costs of adjusting back to the optimal (target) capital structure. Both 
the cost of being off-target and the cost of adjustment need not be homogenous for all banks.  
Theory and empirical studies document that institutional features affect banks’ speed of 
adjustment by restricting the access to equity and debt markets, limiting the flexibility to easily 
alter capital structure and imposing more stringent capital requirements and supervisory 
monitoring (e.g. financial constraints, differences in regulatory and supervisory environments and 
financial system characteristics). See e.g. De Jonghe and Öztekin 2015; John et al., 2012; 
Faulkender et al., 2012a; Öztekin and Flannery 2011; Berger et al. 2008; Flannery and Hankins, 
2013, among others.  
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Not only a country’s institutional setting but also bank-level characteristics could reduce 
(increase) costs or increase (reduce) benefits of being close to the target and thus lead to higher 
(lower) adjustment speeds (see Laeven et al. (2015), among others). We hence hypothesize that as 
costs and benefits of rebalancing the capital structure might be affected by systemic risk and size 
characteristics, so does the speed with which banks adjust leverage and regulatory capital to reach 
their targets. 
This section involves three steps. We first describe the approach we take to estimate the 
effects of systemic risk and size on the speed of adjustment of leverage and regulatory capital 
ratios toward their targets. We then examine their impact on banks’ capital structure and balance 
sheet adjustments. Addressing this issue is paramount to draw effective regulatory and policy 
implications regarding SIFIs. Finally, we examine the role of regulatory pressure in SIFIs’ 
adjustment channels. 
 
4.1. Do SIFIs adjust their capital ratios quicker? 
Equation (3) constitutes a standard partial adjustment model for capital structure in which 
the speed of adjustment is homogeneous across all banks and over time. We now relax this 
assumption and conjecture that the speed with which banks adjust their capital ratio depends on 
different bank specific characteristics. In particular, we analyze whether or not (relative) size and 
systemic risk (exposure/contribution) affect the speed of adjustment. We therefore extend the 
partial adjustment model (as in equation (3)) to allow for time-varying and bank-specific 
adjustment speeds. We follow the approach of Berger et al. (2008), Oztekin and Flannery (2012) 
and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015). More specifically, we adjust the model such that the 
adjustment speed, λ, can vary over time, banks, and countries: 
(3) 𝜆𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 
where Λ is a vector of coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zi,j,t−1 is a set of 
covariates that could affect the adjustment speed. Substituting equation (4) in equation (3) yields 
the equation for a partial adjustment model with heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment: 
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(4) ∆𝐾𝑖𝑗.𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + vt + ui − 𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  
As Berger et al. (2008), Öztekin and Flannery (2012) and De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015), 
we estimate equation (5) in two steps. In the first step, we estimate equation (3) using system 
GMM and obtain an estimate of the target capital ratio,   ?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ = ?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑗,𝑡 + vt̂ + uî, which we use to 
compute each bank’s deviation from its (estimated) target capital ratio, 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑗,𝑡−1= ?̂?𝑖𝑗,𝑡
∗ −𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. 
Substituting the gap in equation (5) we get: 
 
(5) ∆𝐾𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = (𝜆0 + Λ𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1)𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Equation (6) is the second step that only involves a pooled OLS regression of the 
dependent variable (the change in a capital ratio) on a set of variables defined as the product of 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 and the covariates (proxies for systemic risk and (relative and absolute) size, introduced 
one-by-one) affecting the adjustment speed. The vector of estimated coefficients allows us to test 
various hypotheses on the determinants of the adjustment speed. To ease economic interpretation, 
we standardize the independent variables, 𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, before interacting them with 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. Hence, 
the coefficient 𝜆0 can be interpreted as the average speed of adjustment in the sample.
8
  
 Table 7 reports the empirical results from a model where we allow for heterogeneity in the 
adjustment speed towards the optimal capital structure. The impact of (systemic) size and risk on 
the adjustment speed is analyzed in two different setups. First of all, we include a measure of bank 
size (ln(total assets), relative bank size, systemic risk exposure and systemic risk contribution. 
Subsequently, we use the SIFI-index which allocates bank-year observations in quintiles according 
to these four characteristics. The composite SIFI-index provides a summary statistic of systemic 
importance as it covers in a meaningful way four equally-weighted dimensions of systemic 
importance: a proxy of absolute size, systemic size, systemic exposure and contagion risk. The 
index ranges from four to twenty, with the highest value representing the highest level of systemic 
importance that an individual bank can exhibit. For a precise construction of the SIFI-index, see 
section 2.2. 
                                                          
8 In the second stage of the two-step procedure, there is no constant term or additional fixed effects. In the second 
stage, the dependent variable is defined as the first difference of the capital ratio. A non-zero constant or bank fixed 
effect would imply that there is a trend in capital ratios. Note, however, that bank fixed effects are included in the 
estimated target. The gap is the difference between this estimated target and the lagged capital ratio.   
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 We report results in three panels, corresponding with the three capital definitions we 
employ. However, for each column, the three regressions are estimated as a system of equations 
using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, to account for possible contemporaneous cross-equation 
error correlation (see Zellner, 1962). The reported p-values are based on standard errors obtained 
via a bootstrap procedure to mitigate issues related to predictor-generated regressors (see Pagan, 
1984), as the gap depends on the estimated targets (Faulkender et al., 2012; Çolak et al., 2018). 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 In the upper panel, we provide the results for the leverage ratio. In column 1, we report the 
homogenous speed of adjustment. In line with previous results, average leverage speed is 0.36. 
Thus, on average, banks close 36 percent of the gap between actual and target leverage per year. In 
the next column, we introduce jointly the effects of systemic risk and size on leverage speed of 
adjustment. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between ∆CoVaR 
(systemic risk contribution) and the speed of adjustment, indicating that banks who impose more 
externalities on the system adjust faster. Relative bank size and absolute bank size carry a negative 
and statistically significant effect.  
 These results shed light on two aspects regarding SIFIs and TBTF. As highlighted above, 
∆CoVaR apprehends the aggregate financial system performance conditional on a given bank's 
returns dropping below a certain threshold. Such a measure is hence expected to capture contagion 
risks. Accordingly, banks are more sensitive to adjust their leverage faster when they choose to 
take more correlated risks. Although they have access to inexpensive external capital and cheap 
debt funding, sizeable banks can, presumably because of their TBTF status, afford to adjust their 
leverage ratio more slowly. Such a ratio is indeed not a regulatory risk-based capital measure that 
they need to comply with. Such a finding is consistent with moral hazard behavior that leads banks 
to take on excessive risk-taking and engage in multiple activities (e.g., combining lending and 
trading), when they expect to be bailed out in case of distress. Alternatively, larger banks could be 
regarded as more complex and opaque, making it relatively more difficult and costlier for them to 
raise capital.  
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 The economic effect of a one standard deviation change in absolute and relative size on the 
speed of adjustment is slightly larger than that of a similar change in systemic risk contributions. 
This is also reflected in column 3, where we use an index of systemic importance and risk. We 
find that SIFIs adjust significantly slower towards their target ratio, indicating once more that for 
leverage adjustments, the size effect dominates the systemic risk aspect.  
 In the middle and lower panel, we report results for similar regressions except that we 
focus now on regulatory risk weighted capital ratios (Tier 1RWA ratio in middle panel and Total 
capital ratio in lower panel). The first column examines the average adjustment. In subsequent 
columns, conversely to what we find in the leverage ratio specifications, only the coefficient on 
the interaction terms related to the MES is significantly positive, while the effects of ∆CoVaR and 
size on speed of adjustment are not significant. Hence, banks with higher MES adjust faster to the 
target Tier 1 regulatory ratio.  
 As there are no opposite effects on the adjustment speed for the various constituents of the 
SIFI index, it is not surprising that we find, in column 3, that the systemic index coefficient is 
positive and significant, just as for the MES. The result is also economically important and similar 
in magnitude for the MES interaction effect. A one standard deviation increase in the index of 
systemic importance and risk increases the average Tier1 regulatory adjustment speed by 0.018, 
leading to a slightly lower half-life. Such results confirm the hypothesis that SIFIs and TBTF 
institutions may find it easier to change their regulatory capital structure by altering the 
composition of new equity (Tier1) issuances and adjusting their risky asset compositions, and thus 
adjust faster. This is possibly because of higher financial flexibility through relative cost 
advantages on the one hand and adjustments in external growth funding on the other hand. The 
exposure to common shocks that affect the whole financial system (namely the MES) dominates 
the effects of contagion risk and size effects, possibly because banks have to face internally 
increased market monitoring and macroprudential regulatory supervision on the one hand and high 
expected capital shortfall on the other hand, which translate into higher regulatory adjustment 
speed. In addition, it confirms the hypothesis that systemic banks may find it easier to change their 
capital structure by raising inexpensive external capital, cheap debt funding and by altering the 
asset compositions of their balance sheets.  
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 In the lower panel, we repeat the same regressions for the total regulatory capital. All 
results are similar to those we obtain for the Tier 1 regulatory ratio in the middle panel. In sum, we 
learn that the asymmetry in behavior across capital concepts is driven by different elements of the 
SIFI index. First of all, systemic risk and size affect the extent to which banks adjust their capital 
ratios. Second, these factors play an opposite role (on the speed of adjustment) for a leverage ratio 
vis-à-vis regulatory capital ratios.  
 
4.2. Does regulatory pressure affect (SIFIs’) adjustment speeds? 
 We find that the speed of adjustment for leverage ratios is faster than that of regulatory 
capital ratios. Furthermore, we also find that SIFIs adjust their regulatory capital ratios swifter than 
other banks and vice versa for the leverage ratio. In this subsection, we analyze whether these 
differences are caused by regulatory pressure. Banks might indeed have less latitude to freely 
adjust their regulatory capital ratios and specifically to even a lesser extent when their regulatory 
capital buffer is small or when they are below the minimum requirements.  
 We divide banks in a group of well capitalized banks on the one hand, and banks under 
regulatory pressure on the other hand. The group distinction is based on whether or not banks have 
both regulatory capital ratios, the Tier1 ratio and the total capital ratio, above the FDICs ‘Well 
Capitalized’ levels, 8% and 10% respectively. If they do not meet both thresholds, we classify 
them as potentially being under “Regulatory Pressure”. Specifically, we introduce the dummy 
variable ‘Regulatory Pressure’ in our model to distinguish the two groups9.  
In column 4 of Table 7, we analyze whether banks under regulatory pressure have a different 
adjustment speed. In column 5 of Table 7, we interact the SIFI-index and the Regulatory Pressure 
variable and investigate their joint impact on adjustment speeds. 
                                                          
9
 This dummy variable takes the value of one if a bank’s Tier1 RWA capital ratio falls below 8% and/or its Total 
RWA capital ratio falls below 10%. These thresholds coincide with the levels used by the FDIC to determine whether 
US banks are well-capitalized or not. Whenever they are not Well Capitalized, various Prompt Corrective Actions 
may come into play putting regulatory pressure on adjustment (mechanisms) of bank characteristics. We use the FDIC 
thresholds for all banks in the sample in the absence of such information for non-US banks. Recall further, from Table 
2, that most banks hold regulatory capital ratios well above the minimum requirements. We are thus mostly 
differentiating banks that are well above both regulatory requirements versus banks with small, but positive buffers. 
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 First of all, using the dummy variable for being under regulatory pressure or not, we find 
that banks that are not in the highest capitalization group (i.e. under regulatory pressure) adjust 
slower to the target leverage compared to those who are. The difference is economically large. 
This indicates that banks that are not in the most comfortable zone with respect to regulatory 
thresholds may indeed not have discretion in their channels of adjustment, which could slow down 
the adjustment speed on the leverage ratio. Subsequently, in panels B and C of column 4, we do 
not find a significant difference in the adjustment speed for banks under regulatory pressure. 
Contrary to what we find for the leverage ratio, the potential lack of discretion that leads to slower 
speeds of adjustment for the leverage ratio does not lead to slower speeds of adjustment for the 
Tier 1 regulatory ratios. This indicates that the adjustment mechanisms imposed by the regulators 
effectively aim at affecting the regulatory capital ratio solely. Finally, in column 5, we do not find 
that the interaction effect between the SIFI-index and the dummy variable ‘regulatory pressure” is 
significant. Yet, the results documented in columns 3 and 4 pertain. 
 In sum, the results in Table 7 indicate that banks adjust their regulatory capital ratios 
slower than their leverage ratios possibly because they are constrained in their scope by regulation. 
In general, they can make faster adjustments to the leverage ratio. The latter are, however, slowed 
down when they hold small regulatory capital buffers, because of additional scrutiny and pressure 
from regulators.   
 
4.3. Do SIFIs use different adjustment mechanisms? 
 The analyses thus far indicate that: (i) the mechanisms that banks use to adjust their capital 
ratios to return to target depend on whether they are over- or undercapitalized, (ii) the magnitude 
of the adjustments vary with the type of capital ratio, (iii) the speed of adjustment depends on the 
systemic importance of the bank. These combined insights lead to the last research question, which 
is analyzing in a uniform setup whether the adjustment mechanisms differ for SIFIs, depend on the 
type of capital ratio and depend on the sign of the capital gap.  
 To address this question, we estimate the following two threshold regression models: 
(7a)  
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∆BSi,t = c +β1SIFI − indexi,t−1 +
{
 
 
 
 {
(δ0
+) × LevGapi,t           , if LevGapi,t > 0
(δ0
−) × LevGapi,t               , if LevGapi,t < 0
{
(δ2
+) × Tier1Gapi,t      , if Tier1Gapi,t > 0
(δ2
−) × Tier1Gapi,t     , if Tier1Gapi,t < 0
+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
And 
(7b) 
∆BSi,t = c +β1SIFI − indexi,t−1 +
{
 
 
 
 {
(δ0
+ + δ1
+SIFI − indexi,t−1) × LevGapi,t           , if LevGapi,t > 0
(δ0
− + δ1
−SIFI − indexi,t−1) × LevGapi,t               , if LevGapi,t < 0
{
(δ2
+ + δ3
+SIFI − indexi,t−1) × Tier1Gapi,t      , if Tier1Gapi,t > 0
(δ2
− + δ3
−SIFI − indexi,t−1) × Tier1Gapi,t     , if Tier1Gapi,t < 0
+ 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
 More specifically, ∆BSi,t is the growth rate for one of the balance sheet variables (Equity, 
Tier1 capital, Retained Earnings, Assets, RWA, Loans, Liabilities, Cash and marketable securities 
and Liquid Assets). Banks can adjust to their target by either issuing or buying back equity capital 
(Tier1 capital), increasing or decreasing retained earnings or by reducing or increasing their size as 
well as by reshuffling their assets (change in total assets, net loans and risk-weighted assets), 
liabilities (change in total liabilities, long-term borrowings and short-term borrowings) or liquid 
options (change in (short-term) cash and marketable securities and liquid assets). This growth rate 
in key balance sheet components is regressed on deviations from target capital. This approach is 
similar to the one used by previous researchers to examine adjustment mechanisms (Berrospide 
and Edge, 2010; Francis and Osborne, 2009, 2012; Lepetit et al. 2015; De-Ramon et al., 2016).  
 We allow for asymmetric adjustments depending on the sign of the gap and jointly 
investigate the impact of the sign of the leverage ratio gap and the sign of the regulatory capital 
ratio gap. Furthermore, in Equation (7b), we also allow this asymmetric adjustment to depend on 
banks’ systemic size and importance as measured by the SIFI index. More precisely, we jointly 
include in one regression equation the leverage gap and the regulatory gap and their interactions 
with the SIFI index to examine which one is more important for each adjustment mechanism. This 
setup thus allows testing whether banks chose a specific adjustment mechanism in response to a 
regulatory surplus/shortfall vis-à-vis a leverage ratio surplus/shortfall
10
. 
 
                                                          
10
 In this specification, we include two rather than three capital ratios, to avoid multicollinearity problems. We leave 
out the total regulatory capital ratio (gap) as it is highly correlated with the Tier 1 capital ratio (gap). This is not the 
case for the leverage gap and the Tier1RWA gap. The correlation between these two is only 34%. Moreover, in about 
1/3th of bank-year observations, the leverage gap and Tier 1 gap will have opposite signs.  
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 In Table 8, we report the results of our estimates of the model presented in equations (7a) 
and (7b).  The columns correspond with the growth rates in various balance sheet items. The 
reported standard errors are obtained via a bootstrap procedure to mitigate issues related to 
predictor-generated regressors (see Pagan, 1984), as the gap depends on the estimated targets 
(Faulkender et al., 2012; Çolak et al., 2018). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 In panel A, we first report results for the restricted Equation (7a), in which we do not allow 
yet for interaction terms between the capital ratio gaps and the SIFI.  First of all, the 
coefficients associated with the systemic index variable (SIFI-index) are in general significant and 
negative, indicating that compared to "less" systemic banks, "more" systemic banks have ceteris 
paribus a lower growth rate in total assets but also in the different balance sheet components.  
 Furthermore, we find that active capital management (growth in equity and Tier 1 capital) 
is mainly used when banks are undercapitalized with respect to their own regulatory capital target. 
The larger the shortfall of the Tier 1 capital ratio from its target, the larger the growth rate in 
equity and Tier 1 capital implying that banks rely on equity issuance. Moreover, the relative 
magnitudes of these estimated coefficients is larger for Tier 1 than for common equity indicating 
that they prefer other instruments eligible for Tier 1 capital over pure equity in these occasions.  
 Interestingly and as expected, total asset growth is driven by deviations from the leverage 
target, whereas risk-weighted asset growth is driven by regulatory capital deviations. Concerning 
total asset growth, we find an economically large effect of a positive leverage gap. The more 
undercapitalized a bank is with respect to its leverage target, the larger the reduction in bank size. 
Concerning the RWA growth rate, we find that it to be lower, the more the bank’s regulatory 
capital ratio falls below its own target. However, when banks are overcapitalized with respect to 
their Tier 1 target, the growth rate of RWA is larger, the more they are overcapitalized (i.e., the 
more negative the Tier 1 gap becomes). Moreover, the responsiveness of RWA growth to the 
magnitude of the gap is larger when they are above their regulatory target capital ratio, than when 
they are below.  
 Regarding liability growth rate, we find it to be affected both by the leverage ratio gap and 
the regulatory capital ratio gap, and to a similar extent for both ratios and also irrespective of the 
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sign of the gap. On the one hand, the more banks are undercapitalized (i.e., increases in the 
positive gap), the lower is the growth in liabilities. On the other hand, the more banks are 
overcapitalized (i.e., decreases in the negative gap), the higher is their liabilities growth rate. 
Similarly to liabilities, loan growth is driven by both shortfalls and surpluses of both the leverage 
ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio. In terms of economic magnitude, the responsiveness is slightly larger 
for the regulatory capital definition.  
 Finally, cash growth and liquid asset growth is larger when the Tier 1 capital ratio is below 
target. The additional Tier 1 capital that undercapitalized banks raise is mainly hoard as cash 
(hence the growth), which subsequently reduces the RWA growth. However, when their leverage 
ratio is above their target (negative leverage gap), banks reduce their liquid asset growth, which is 
in contract to expectations as it harms in closing the gap.  
 
 We now turn to the unconstrained Equation (7b). That is, we now investigate the balance 
sheet adjustments in response to gaps in the leverage ratio and Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio, also 
allowing for heterogeneity depending on the SIFI index and the signs of both the leverage and 
regulatory gaps. In panel B of Table 8, we find that the interaction with the SIFI index is more 
often significant when banks experience a positive gap (hence capital shortfall) and this both for 
the leverage ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio. The responsiveness of equity, liabilities and asset 
growth with respect to shortfalls from the Tier 1 capital target ratio is larger, for a given magnitude 
of the shortfall, for SIFIs compared to non-SIFIs. This indicates that for increasingly larger 
regulatory capital gaps, compared to smaller banks, SIFIs resort more to raising equity, 
downsizing and shrinking debts. On the contrary, SIFIs exhibit a lower responsiveness in 
adjustment mechanisms (equity, Tier 1 capital, retained earnings and total assets) when they are 
undercapitalized with respect to the leverage ratio target. These findings are consistent with the 
idea that banks with capital shortfall have less capacity to grow, lend and/or get into debt 
compared with other banks. In all instances, these both sets of results are consistent with the 
results in panels of Table 7, where we found a lower adjustment speed for SIFIs for the leverage 
ratio and a faster adjustment speed for SIFIs for the regulatory capital ratios than less systemic 
institutions. 
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 Finally, in panel C, we present an extension of Equation (7b) and also analyze whether 
regulatory pressure affects the channels that banks use to adjust their capital ratio towards their 
target. First of all, note that adding these additional interaction terms leaves the results on the other 
coefficients unaffected. The discussion of the results of panel B thus pertains. Second, we find that 
banks that are under regulatory and supervisory pressure, adjust certain items to a different extent 
compared to their well-capitalized peers.  
 Banks under regulatory pressure are found to issue Tier1 capital more extensively, the 
more negative the leverage gap becomes.  Hence, even though these banks would need lower 
equity growth to get back to their leverage target, they possibly make adjustments in line with the 
regulatory requirements. Consequently, this will slow down their leverage adjustment speed, 
which supports the findings reported in column 4 of panel A of Table 7. Moreover, such banks 
reduce their asset growth to a lesser extent for a given leverage shortfall, also in line with the 
lower adjustment speed of leverage ratios for banks that are under regulatory pressure.  On the 
other hand, they reduce their liabilities and loan growth to a larger extent when their leverage ratio 
is below their target (when banks are overleveraged).  
 We now turn to the interaction effects of the Tier1RWA gap and the regulatory pressure 
variable. In contrast to the results in rows 5 and 6, we hardly find any significant interaction 
coefficients in rows 11 and 12 (except for Cash and marketable securities and Liquid assets) 
indicating that the impact of the magnitude and sign of the regulatory capital gap on the 
adjustment mechanisms does not differ when banks are under regulatory pressure or not. This lack 
of significance squares with the findings presented in panels B and C of Table 7, where we showed 
that the speed of adjustment of regulatory capital ratios was not different when banks might be 
facing regulatory pressures. 
 
 
5. Robustness checks and further issues 
 We examine the robustness of our results to alternative specifications. First, we analyze 
two sources of non-linearities in the speed of adjustment. First, we test whether the speed of 
adjustment depends on the sign of the gap. Put differently, we allow for asymmetric adjustment 
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speeds for over –and undercapitalized banks. Second, we also test whether the speed of adjustment 
of the leverage ratio depends on the stance (sign) of the regulatory capital ratio and vice versa. 
These two sources of asymmetries in the speed of adjustment are analyzed in Table 9. In summary, 
we show in column 1 of panels A, B and C that the speed of adjustment is significantly lower 
when banks are overcapitalized than when they are undercapitalized, but this effect is more 
dominant for the leverage ratio than the regulatory capital ratio. Furthermore, in column 2, the 
interaction coefficient with the dummy of being undercapitalized with respect to the other capital 
concept (i.e., Tier 1 capital gap in panel A, the leverage ratio in panels B and C) is significant in 
three occasions and if so, it is negative. In panel A, we find that the asymmetry in adjustment 
speed above and below target is exacerbated when banks are undercapitalized in the other capital 
dimension, i.e. with respect to their internal target for the regulatory capital ratio. This is not only 
an indication that these two capital concepts are not treated in isolation by banks, but also that 
banks that are below their regulatory target respond slower. The latter finding could be due to 
more regulatory scrutiny (and hence less room for flexibility) when banks' regulatory capital ratios 
are lower. Meanwhile, we do not find that the stance of the leverage gap matters for the speed of 
adjustment of the regulatory capital ratio. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 Second, De-Ramon et al. (2016) have shown that the balance sheet adjustments that UK 
banks make to get back to their target have changed since the global financial crisis. We 
investigate a similar issue, but rather than looking at each and every adjustment mechanisms, we 
look at the impact on the speed of adjustment, which summarizes the underlying adjustment 
mechanism. In particular, we not only check whether the speed of adjustment has changed since 
2007, but also whether systemic importance have different effects on the adjustment speed during 
the pre-global financial crisis period and during the (post-)crisis period. Indeed, capital 
management and balance sheet behavior may be influenced by banks' ability to tap capital 
markets. For that purpose, we analyze the impact of systemic importance on adjustment speed 
estimations allowing for non-linearity in the relationship by a dummy capturing the normal pre-
crisis times (2001-2006) and crisis and post global financial crisis sample years (2007-2012). In 
panel A of Table 10, we report the regression results. In the lower panel B, we present the 
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adjustment speeds implied by the estimated coefficients (by capital ratio definition) for the pre- 
and post-2007 period, for small banks, average banks and SIFIs. Small banks (SIFIs) are defined 
as those for which the normalized SIFI index is -1 (+1), i.e. one standard deviation below (above) 
the mean. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 In this robustness check, we find first of all, that adjustment speeds went up since 2007, 
both for small and average banks as well as SIFIs and for all capital ratio definitions. Second, we 
find prior to 2007 that SIFIs adjust slower than small banks, with larger differences between the 
two groups for leverage ratios compared to regulatory capital ratios. Third, in the post 2007 period, 
SIFIs still adjust their leverage ratio slower than small banks, but the difference in adjustment 
speeds between the two groups has narrowed compared to the pre-2007 period. Fourth, an opposite 
pattern is found for regulatory capital ratios. Since the global financial crisis, the adjustment speed 
of regulatory capital ratios has been higher for SIFI banks vis-à-vis small banks.  The observation 
that SIFIs adjust slower to their leverage capital ratio, and faster to their regulatory capitals ratios, 
indicates that SIFIs have become more concerned about their regulatory capital levels than their 
leverage since the global financial crisis.  
 Finally, our sample focuses on banks from 28 OECD countries as these are the countries 
where most of the G-SIBs (Globally Systemically Important Banks) are headquartered. One other 
country where G-SIBs are prevalent is China. One may wonder whether our results would hold in 
the case of the Chinese banking sector which is characterized by a specific institutional 
environment. How Chinese banks adjust their capital ratio has been examined by Molyneux et al. 
(2014). In particular, they study the role of ownership structure on Chinese banks’ target capital 
and speed of adjustment. They do find differences in adjustment speeds depending on ownership 
(foreign banks adjust swifter than domestic government-owned banks); but only for regulatory 
capital ratios. Furthermore, De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) report that the speed of adjustment is 
slightly lower for mutual institutions (cooperative and savings banks)
11
 compared with commercial 
banks, mostly because they cannot use external capital to make adjustments. Finally, the insights 
of De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) on the cross-country drivers of adjustment speeds shed light on 
                                                          
11
 In De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015)’s sample, there are no government owned/connected banks (which would be the 
case for China), but the closest resemblance with (Chinese) government-owned banks may be with cooperative and 
savings banks who are also not necessarily profit maximizers. 
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whether our results would hold for Chinese SIFIs. While China’s inflation rate is similar to the 
average OECD country, its stock market is not yet as developed as in most OECD countries. The 
latter may harm swift adjustments in the capital ratio by limiting the possibility to raise equity. As 
such, although it could be argued that such banks could easily rely on government capital 
injections, we conjecture, but leave it for further research to demonstrate, that SIFIs in China 
would, all else equal, have a slower adjustment speed than SIFIs in our sample of banks belonging 
to OECD countries.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The Basel III Accord has, among other things, introduced more stringent capital 
requirements, a new leverage ratio and also capital surcharges for systemically important banks. In 
this paper, we investigate how banks adjust their capital ratios to reach their desired levels by 
focusing on two dimensions. We look at whether the adjustment speeds and mechanisms are 
different for ratios set by regulators (risk-weighted capital ratios) and those internally targeted by 
bank managers (leverage) and pay special attention to systemically important banks. We consider 
a pre-Basel III period ranging from 2001 and 2012 to examine how banks have managed their 
capital ratios by using a sample of listed banks across OECD countries. We augment standard 
partial adjustment models of bank capital towards bank-specific and time-varying optimal capital 
ratios with various SIFI indicators as well as a systemic risk index based on the quintiles of such 
indicators.  
 On the whole, our findings reveal that the speed at which banks adjust and the way they 
adjust show large differences. In general, banks are more flexible and faster in adjusting to their 
leverage capital ratio than to regulatory capital ratios. However, SIFIs are slower than other banks 
in adjusting to their target leverage ratio but quicker in reaching their target regulatory ratios. 
When we dig into the four aspects that define SIFIs, we find that these opposite findings on the 
leverage ratio and regulatory ratio are explained by the differential impact that size and systemic 
risk have. Larger banks adjust slower and this effect dominates for the leverage ratio, whereas 
systemically riskier banks adjust faster and more so their regulatory capital ratios. Furthermore, 
banks that are closer to the regulatory minimum requirements are constrained in the adjustments 
they can make on their leverage ratio, resulting in a slower speed of adjustment. 
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 Our findings contribute to the bank capital structure adjustment literature and carry various 
policy implications. In case of any sudden need to augment capital ratios at systemically important 
banks, regulators and supervisors should be aware that such institutions would, according to our 
results, downsize to a larger extent than smaller banks. If in a given country the market share of 
systemic banks is relatively large, the real effects on the economy will consequently be more 
important. Symmetrically, a relief in capital constraints or a positive capital shock is also expected 
to push SIFIs to expand faster than other banks. On the whole, this procyclical behavior is more 
pronounced for systemic institutions, which are however also found to more extensively rely on 
equity issues when needed than other banks. Such findings are also expected to be particularly 
useful for supervisors when they gauge and adjust the specific capital requirement they can impose 
on each bank in the industry differently and separately, which they are allowed to do through Pillar 
2 of the Basel III Accord. 
 Future research could bridge the gap between De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) and our 
paper. They show that the speed of capital structure adjustments by banks is heterogeneous across 
countries. In particular, they find that banks make faster capital structure adjustments in countries 
with more stringent capital requirements, better supervisory monitoring, more developed capital 
markets and high inflation. In our work, we focus instead on heterogeneity in the capital structure 
adjustment process across types of banks. An interesting avenue for further research is examining 
both issues jointly. That is, one could investigate whether the speed of adjustment differences 
between SIFIs and smaller banks are heterogeneous across countries depending on the institutional 
setting (e.g., strength of supervision, capital market development) or market structure. The effects 
in our sample may be limited as we focus on banks from 28 OECD countries for which the 
institutional setting is more homogeneous. A larger cross-country setup could uncover these 
potential relationships.  
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Table 1. Sample composition 
Panel A shows the sample country composition used for estimating the speed of adjustments towards target capital structures. It 
presents the distribution of 554 listed banks from 26 OECD countries, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czech, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United-States, totaling 4962 bank-year observations.  
Country 
Number 
of banks 
Number of Bank-
Year observations 
 Country 
Number 
of banks 
Number of Bank-
Year observations 
Australia 5 56  Luxembourg 1 5 
Austria 7 54  Mexico 0 0 
Belgium 2 24  Netherlands 1 6 
Canada 8 86  Norway 11 103 
Czech 1 6  Poland 3 13 
Denmark 16 117  Portugal 3 36 
Finland 1 12  Slovakia 1 1 
France 6 52  South Korea 0 0 
Germany 5 43  Spain 6 59 
Greece 7 32  Sweden 4 46 
Hungary 1 4  Switzerland 6 31 
Ireland 2 18  Turkey 9 32 
Italy 14 118  United-Kingdom 5 55 
Japan 22 148  United-States 407 3805 
    Total 554 4962 
 
 
Panel B shows the distribution of the number of observations (banks) by year, both in absolute numbers as well as frequencies  
Year Freq. Percent 
2001 349 7.03 
2002 362 7.30 
2003 375 7.56 
2004 386 7.78 
2005 405 8.16 
2006 450 9.07 
2007 467 9.41 
2008 477 9.61 
2009 440 8.87 
2010 431 8.69 
2011 415 8.36 
2012 405 8.16 
Total 4962 100 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
This table provides the definition and summary statistics for all the regression variables of a sample of 554 publicly listed OECD banks from 2001 to 2012. We report summary 
statistics for variables measured at time t. For all variables (in panels A, B and C), we provide number of observations, mean, standard deviation, as well as some percentiles (p5, 
p25, median, p75 and p95) for each variable, across all banks and countries. 
Variable Definition Source N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
Panel A: Determinants of the target capital structure       
Leverage Common equity ratio defined as total equity over total unweighted assets. 
Bloomberg, Thomsen-
Reuters Advanced Analytic 
(TRAA) 
4962 0.093 0.043 0.039 0.069 0.088 0.109 0.162 
Tier1RWA Ratio of capital tier1 over to total risk weighted assets. Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.117 0.036 0.07 0.093 0.111 0.135 0.182 
Total capital Ratio of total capital tier1 over to total risk weighted assets. Bloomberg 4962 0.141 0.039 0.102 0.117 0.132 0.155 0.209 
Log(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of bank total assets (in USD billion). TRAA 4962 8.151 2.311 5.585 6.401 7.421 9.395 13.1 
Credit Risk Loan Loss Provisions over net loans. TRAA 4962 0.007 0.009 0 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.023 
Retail Funding Total customer deposit divided by total funding (st borrow+Tot.Cust.Dep). Bloomberg, TRAA 4962 0.897 0.119 0.652 0.863 0.937 0.979 1 
Liquidity Net loans over total deposit. TRAA 4962 1.089 0.312 0.583 0.911 1.085 1.259 1.598 
Fixed Assets Net fixed assets over total assets. Bloomberg, TRAA 4962 0.016 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.015 0.021 0.036 
Diversification Non-interest income over total income. TRAA 4962 0.196 0.109 0.053 0.119 0.175 0.252 0.414 
Loan-to-asset Net loans over total assets. TRAA 4962 0.690 0.148 0.44 0.61 0.692 0.775 1 
Efficiency Cost income ratio, non-interest expense over total income. TRAA 4962 0.451 0.131 0.249 0.367 0.44 0.528 0.685 
RoA Return on assets, defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. TRAA 4962 0.007 0.01 -0.009 0.004 0.008 0.011 0.017 
Market Z-score Return-based Z-score Bloomberg, TRAA 4962 3.429 1.874 0.564 2.053 3.331 4.556 6.844 
RWA_TA Risk-weighted asset ratio Bloomberg, TRAA 4945 0.738 0.184 0.415 0.632 0.743 0.869 1 
 
Panel B: Determinants of the adjustment speed 
         
MES (%) Marginal Expected Shortfall Appendix Eq. A1 4859 1.692 1.907 -0.417 0.259 1.257 2.601 5.53 
∆CoVaR (%) ∆Conditional Value-at-Risk Appendix Eq. A2 4841 1.557 1.743 -1.006 0.405 1.33 2.609 4.721 
TAGdp Natural logarithm of bank total assets over GDP. 
TRAA, OECD stats 
Metadata, IMF WEO 
4962 0.063 0.197 0 0 0 0.004 0.518 
logTA Natural logarithm of bank total assets (in USD billion). TRAA 4962 8.151 2.311 5.585 6.401 7.421 9.395 13.1 
SIFI-index aggregated systemic importance index Subsection 4.1.2         
 
Panel C: Growth in adjustment mechanisms 
 
        
Total Equity Average growth in total equity scaled by average total equity Bloomberg, TRAA 4962 0.081 0.18 -0.159 0.007 0.064 0.143 0.375 
Tier1 capital Average growth in Tier1 capital scaled by average total equity Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4945 0.08 0.172 -0.147 0.008 0.061 0.136 0.376 
Retained Earnings Average growth in retained earnings by average total equity Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.023 0.135 -0.192 -0.012 0.04 0.085 0.185 
Total Assets Average growth in total assets scaled by average total assets Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 0.079 0.196 -0.287 0.001 0.066 0.158 0.421 
Net Loans Average growth in net loans scaled by average total assets Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 0.052 0.092 -0.082 -0.004 0.042 0.095 0.224 
Risk-Weighted Assets Average growth in risk-weighted assets by average total assets Bloomberg, TRAA. 4945 0.055 0.122 -0.107 -0.006 0.043 0.103 0.251 
Total Liabilities Average growth in total liabilities by average total liabilities Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 0.081 0.124 -0.09 0.006 0.063 0.141 0.305 
LT borrowing Average growth in long-term borrowing by average total liabilities Bloomberg, TRAA. 4961 0.009 0.048 -0.056 -0.01 0 0.023 0.094 
ST borrowing Average growth in short-term borrowing scaled by average total liabilities Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 0.003 0.048 -0.074 -0.016 0 0.022 0.083 
∆Leverage Change in common equity ratio (percentage) Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 -0.009 2.506 -3.911 -0.635 -0.016 0.569 3.991 
∆Tier1RWA Change in Tier1 capital ratio (percentage) Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.144 1.713 -2.54 -0.64 0.09 0.84 2.99 
∆Total capital Change in total capital ratio (percentage) Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.080 1.822 -2.77 -0.78 0.03 0.9 3.05 
groLeverage Average growth rates of common equity ratio. Bloomberg, TRAA. 4962 0.025 0.241 -0.328 -0.075 -0.002 0.073 0.482 
groTier1RWA Average growth rates of Tier1 capital ratio. Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.024 0.154 -0.192 -0.056 0.008 0.081 0.31 
groTotal capital Average growth rates of total capital ratio. Bloomberg, Bankscope. 4962 0.015 0.131 -0.176 -0.057 0.003 0.07 0.257 
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Table 3. Pairwise Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix of the main regression variables for the sample of publicly listed OECD banks from 2001 to 2012, containing 4962 bank-year observations. 
All correlations are significant at the 1% level, unless otherwise noted. , ** and * indicate significance of pair-wise correlations at the 10% and 5%, whereas NS indicates 
insignificance at the 10% level. 
Capital 
Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Panel A: Capital ratios
Tier1RWA (1) 0.58
Total capital (2) 0.635 0.784
Panel B: Determinants of the target capital structure
Log(Total Assets (3) -0.367 -0.285 -0.212
Credit Risk (4) -0.033* -0.032* -0.057 0.048
Retail Funding (5) 0.305 0.21 0.134 -0.553 0.045
Liquidity (6) 0.18 0.317 0.239 -0.304 -0.023
NS 0.475
Fixed Assets (7) 0.266 0.137 0.049 -0.362 0.107 0.273 0.18
Diversification (8) -0.155 -0.079 -0.106 0.523 0.055 -0.266 -0.019
NS 0.035*
Loan-to-asset (9) 0.239 -0.135 -0.185 -0.26 0.085 0.248 -0.429 0.2 -0.228
Efficiency (10) 0.09 0.112 0.035* -0.15 0.204 0.276 0.345 0.374 0.399 0.002
NS
RoA (11) 0.274 0.217 0.151 -0.021
NS -0.637 0.019
NS 0.055 -0.043 0.077 -0.011
NS -0.305
Market Z-score (12) -0.003
NS -0.048 0.006
NS 0.048 -0.489 -0.102 -0.024** -0.129 0.044 -0.081 -0.241 0.439
RWA_TA (13) 0.438 -0.139 0.046 -0.455 0.085 0.322 -0.05 0.247 -0.282 0.51 0.014
NS 0.044 -0.023
NS
Panel C: Determinants of the adjustment speed
MES (14) -0.069 -0.046 -0.05 0.536 0.296 -0.228 -0.146 -0.153 0.248 -0.079 -0.015
NS -0.153 -0.422 -0.173
∆CoVaR (15) 0.046 0.008NS -0.004NS 0.397 0.24 -0.133 -0.09 -0.104 0.187 0.022NS 0.015NS -0.087 -0.327 -0.097 0.637
TAGdp (16) -0.342 -0.159 -0.118 0.652 -0.008
NS -0.524 -0.315 -0.27 0.305 -0.223 -0.142 -0.079 -0.016
NS -0.46 0.306 0.196
SIFI-index (17) -0.206 -0.186 -0.165 0.833 0.157 -0.409 -0.262 -0.291 0.423 -0.103 -0.104 -0.051 -0.169 -0.317 0.778 0.697 0.424
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Table 4. Estimating the target capital ratio 
Panel A of this table presents results for two-step System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (Blundell 
and Bond's (1998)) of a partial adjustment model of bank capital: Kij,t = λ(βXij,t−1 + vt + ui) +
(1 − λ)Kij,t−1 + εij,t.  k𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜆(𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡 + u𝑖) + εi,j,t. Bank capital,  k𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, is measure of 
capital for bank i in country j in period t. We use a sample of 554 listed banks from OECD countries, over the 2001–
2012 period. We estimate the partial adjustment model separately using three alternative capital ratio measures: Leverage 
ratio defined as total equity over total assets, Tier1RWA defined as regulatory capital Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted 
assets and Total capital defined as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
bank-characteristics that define banks’ target capital ratio. To check the validity of the estimators, we conduct two tests, 
over-identifying test and test for autocorrelation. Hansen test is a test of exogeneity of all instruments as a group. 
Arellano-Bond test is a test of the absence of second order residual autocorrelation. In panel B, we report summary 
statistics (mean, standard deviation, p5, p25, p50, p75 and p95) of the deviations from the estimated target capital ratio. 
p-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A. A partial adjustment model of bank capital 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependents Leverage Tier1RWA Total capital 
Lagged dependent variable 0.556*** 0.715*** 0.672*** 
 (0.0864) (0.0560) (0.0668) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.00231*** -0.000878* -0.000647 
 (0.000701) (0.000488) (0.000538) 
Credit Risk 0.248* 0.268* 0.188 
 (0.133) (0.147) (0.159) 
Retail Funding 0.0529*** -0.00260 0.00324 
 (0.00917) (0.00504) (0.00695) 
Liquidity -0.0468*** -0.000793 -0.00212 
 (0.00660) (0.00372) (0.00449) 
Fixed Assets -0.0689 0.0604 -0.000797 
 (0.128) (0.0692) (0.0783) 
Diversification -0.0136 -0.0152* -0.0164** 
 (0.0106) (0.00831) (0.00819) 
Loan-to-asset -0.114** -0.0155 -0.0418 
 (0.0456) (0.0171) (0.0317) 
Efficiency  -0.000564 -0.00144 -0.00600 
 (0.0117) (0.00990) (0.00959) 
RoA 0.0865 -0.0352 0.0392 
 (0.212) (0.135) (0.162) 
Market Z-score 0.00224 0.00306 -0.000786 
 (0.00449) (0.00589) (0.00609) 
RWA_TA -0.0480 -0.0232 0.0175 
 (0.0791) (0.0352) (0.0579) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,962 4,962 4,962 
Bank 554 554 554 
Country 26 26 26 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.263 0.948 0.919 
AR2 test (p-value) 0.619 0.575 0.548 
 
Panel B. Deriving capital deviations 
 N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
Dev_CAPR 4962 -0.000 0.055 -0.090 -0.018 0.001 0.020 0.104 
Dev_Tier1RWA 4962 0.009 0.055 -0.082 -0.024 0.008 0.042 0.096 
Dev_TotalCap 4962 0.003 0.036 -0.053 -0.015 0.005 0.023 0.053 
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Table 5. Balance sheet adjustment mechanisms in response to a capital surplus or shortfall  
The table provides evidence of whether the average annual growth rates of the main banks’ adjustment mechanisms vary in various quintiles of the capital ratio deviation (gap) for 
three definitions of capital deviations (leverage ratio, Tier1RWA and Total capital, respectively). For each of the three definitions of capital ratios, we report three columns 
corresponding with three of five quintiles (bottom, middle, and top quintile) of the gap between the estimated target and lagged actual capital ratio. Quintile 1 (Q1) corresponds with 
the most overcapitalized banks (underleveraged banks, i.e. largest negative gap), Quintile 3 (Q3) banks are closest to their capital ratio target, whereas banks in quintile 5 (Q5) are 
the most undercapitalized (overleveraged banks, i.e. largest positive gap). Thus, we compare the change rates of the capital ratios (∆Capital ratio) and the scaled annual growth rates 
of the financial characteristics: the three definitions of capital ratios (groCapital ratio), total assets (Assets), total common equity (Equity), total liabilities (Liabilities), net loans 
(Loans), risk-weighted-assets (RWA), long-term (LT) and short-term (ST) borrowing, internal capital (Retained Earnings) and external capital (Tier1 capital). All variables are 
expressed in percentages (see Table 2 for more details). For each variable, we report the average growth rate, the number of observations per group (below the mean value) and the 
results of pairwise t-tests of equality of means of the extreme quintiles compared with the middle quintile, respectively. We report the p-values of these equality of means tests and 
use a bootstrap procedure to account for the fact that the classificiation in quintiles is based on an estimated target.. Differences in the observations are due to differences in data 
availability.  
 
 
Leverage Gap 
Test for equality of 
mean 
 
Tier1RWA Gap 
Test for equality of 
mean 
 
Total capital Gap 
Test for equality of 
mean 
Adjustment mechanisms 
 (Means/Observations) 
 
Q1 Q3 Q5 
Quintile 1 
vs 3 
Quintile 3 
vs 5 
 
Q1 Q3 Q5 
Quintile 
1 vs 3 
Quintile 3 
vs 5 
 
Q1 Q3 Q5 
Quintile 
1 vs 3 
Quintile 3 
vs 5 
 Overcap.   Undercap. p-value p-value 
 
Overcap.   Undercap. p-value p-value 
 
Overcap.   Undercap. p-value p-value 
∆Capital ratio  -2.19 0.07 2.08 0 0 -0.97 0.18 1.23 0 0 -1.31 0.09 1.44 0 0 
   993 993 992     993 993 992      993 993 992   
groCapital ratio  -14.51 1.62 23.65 0 0  -6.47 2.13 12.52 0 0  -7.35 0.89 12.06 0 0 
   993 993 992    993 993 992    993 993 992   
Total Assets  21.78 8.19 -7.69 0 0 
 
12.62 8.02 1.95 0 0 
 
12.58 8.17 2.37 0 0 
 
 993 993 992   
 
993 993 992   
 
993 993 992   
Total Liabilities  10.43 8.17 4.73 0 0 
 
11.35 8.4 4.78 0 0 
 
11.46 8.12 4.17 0 0 
   993 993 992   
 
993 993 992   
 
993 993 992   
Common Equity  4.37 8.89 9.9 0 0.25 5.96 8.89 10.24 0 0.11 5.61 7.96 10.95 0 0 
  993 993 992    993 993 992     993 993 992   
Net Loans  6.25 5.75 2.87 0.24 0 
 
7.92 5.56 2.17 0 0 
 
7.95 5.26 1.76 0 0 
 
 993 993 992 
 
  
 
993 993 992   
 
993 993 992   
Risk-Weighted Assets  5.96 5.43 4.41 0.30 0.09 
 
9.4 5.54 1.83 0 0 
 
10.62 5.25 0.29 0 0 
 
 991 988 990     
 
990 990 989   
 
992 990 987   
LT borrowing  1.87 0.9 -0.42 0 0 
 
1.74 0.87 0.26 0 0 
 
1.58 0.89 0.11 0 0 
 
 992 993 992     
 
993 993 991     
 
993 993 991   
ST borrowing  0.71 0.34 0.15 0.09 0.40 
 
0.8 0.46 -0.68 0.12 010 
 
1.02 0.33 -0.57 0 0 
   993 993 992     
 
993 993 992     
 
993 993 992   
Retained Earnings (internal capital)  1.09 2.56 2.27 0.02 0.64  1.53 3.18 1.47 0 0.01  1.71 3.24 1.17 0 0 
  993 993 992      993 993 992    993 993 992   
Tier1 (external capital)  4.79 8.60 10.09 0 0.08  4.19 8.11 12.18 0 0  5.58 7.61 10.95 0.01 0 
  991 988 990      990 990 989      992 990 987     
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Table 6. Balance sheet adjustment mechanisms: joint stance of the leverage gap and Tier1RWA gap 
This table presents average annual growth rates of the main banks’ adjustment mechanisms in four blocks of columns, when examining the joint stance of the leverage gap and the 
regulatory capital. We report information for four groups of banks based on the situations of joint stance of the leverage gap and Tier1RWA gap: the situations where both signal 
overcapitalization (Group 1), both signal undercapitalization (Group 2), overcapitalized leverage, but undercapitalized regulatory (Group 3), and undercapitalized leverage, but 
overcapitalized regulatory (Group 4). Thus, we compare the change rates of the capital ratios (∆Leverage and ∆Tier1RWA) and the scaled annual growth rates of the financial 
characteristics: capital ratios (groLeverage and groTier1RWA), total assets (Assets), total common equity (Equity), total liabilities (Liabilities), net loans (Loans), risk-weighted-
assets (RWA), long-term (LT) and short-term (ST) borrowing, internal capital (Retained Earnings) and external capital (Tier1 capital). All variables are expressed in percentages 
(see Table 2 for more details). For each variable, we report the number of observations per group and the average growth rate. In the right hand side panel, we provide test results 
of pairwise t-tests of equality of means of a specific growth rate in a given group of banks with the corresponding growth rate for another group.  We report the p-values of these 
equality of means tests and use a bootstrap procedure to account for the fact that the classificiation in quintiles is based on estimated targets.. Differences in the observations are 
due to differences in data availability.  
 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2 
 
Group 3 Group 4  
Test for equality of mean 
p-values 
Adjustment mechanisms 
(Observations, Means-%) 
 Above target for 
leverage: k*<k 
Below target for 
leverage: k*>k  
Above target for 
leverage: k*<k 
Below target for 
leverage: k*>k 
 
Group 
1 vs. 2 
Group 
3 vs. 4 
Group 
2 vs. 4 
Group 
2 vs. 3 
Group 
1 vs. 4 
Group 
1 vs. 3  Above target for 
Tier1RWA: k*<k 
Below target for 
Tier1RWA: k*>k  
Below target for 
Tier1RWA: k*>k 
Above target for 
Tier1RWA: k*<k 
 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
∆Leverage  1321 -1.17 1886 1.09  1082 -0.76 673 0.4  0 0 0 0 0 0 
∆Tier1RWA  1321 -0.59 1886 0.73  1082 0.51 673 -0.63  0 0 0 0.55 0 0 
groLeverage  1321 -7.76 1886 13.11  1082 -4.76 673 4.39  0 0 0 0 0 0 
groTier1RWA  1321 -3.81 1886 7.38  1082 5.69 673 -4.36  0 0 0 0.33 0.01 0 
Total Assets  1321 15.27 1886 0.42  1082 13.57 673 5.12  0 0 0.02 0 0 0 
Total Liabilities  1321 11.26 1886 5.86  1082 8.22 673 7.98  0 0.69 0 0 0 0 
Common Equity   1321 5.73 1886 10.30  1082 7.21 673 8.04  0 0.34 0.04 0 0 0 
Net Loans  1321 7.60 1886 3.55 
 
1082 4.57 673 6.42  0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 
Risk-Weighted Assets  1315 8.28 1880 3.94 
 
1080 3.28 670 8.09  0 0 0 0.73 0.16 0 
LT borrowing  1321 1.97 1886 0.23 
 
1081 1.13 673 0.48  0 0 0 0 0 0.20 
ST borrowing  1321 0.86 1886 0.03 
 
1082 -0.07 673 0.70  0 0 0 0.48 0.58 0 
Retained Earnings (internal capital)  1321 1.72 1886 3.07  1082 1.31 673 2.78  0 0.03 0.46 0.09 0 0.54 
Tier1 capital (external capital)  1315 5.26 1880 10.81  1080 7.99 670 5.72  0 0 0 0.51 0 0 
 
 
  
 43 
 
 
 
Table 7: Determinants of adjustment speed to target capital structure: effects of systemic risk and size 
on speed of adjustment. 
This table reports coefficient estimates for a system of Seeming Unrelated regressions. In particular, we estimate a heterogeneous partial 
adjustment model for three different definitions of the capital ratio (Leverage, Tier1RWA and Total capital): k𝑖,j,𝑡 − k𝑖,j,𝑡−1 = (𝜆0 + Λ 𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1) ×
Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1+εi,j,t.  
The dependent variable is the change in the capital ratio, which is regressed on the gap (deviation between the estimated target and the lagged 
value of the capital ratio) and interactions of the gap with other variables captured by 𝑍𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1. In column 2, we include as interaction variables: the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES), the delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (∆CoVaR), the relative bank size to GDP (RelativeSize) and the natural 
logarithm of bank total assets (Size). In column 3, we use a composite indicator of these four dimensions, labelled SIFI-index. In Column 4, we 
add an interaction of the gap with an indicator that is one if either the Tier 1 RWA is below 8% or the Total Capital Ratio is below 10% (not Well-
Capitalized), whereas in the last column we add the composite SIFI index and the Well Capitalized dummy jointly (as well as their interaction). 
All continuous variables are standardized before being interacted with the capital deviation to facilitate the economic magnitude interpretation. 
The regression results are based on a sample of listed OECD banks over the 2001-2012 period. P-values based on robust standard errors, are 
obtained following a bootstrapping procedure to account for the estimated regressors (namely, estimated capital targets are used to obtain the 
gaps). Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***/**/*. The letter a (b) following the p-values 
indicates the cases where that coefficient is significantly different from its analogue in panel a (b) at least at the 10% significance level. 
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P an el A:
Gap (i,t-1) 0.361*** 0.332*** 0.364*** 0.373*** 0.376***
(0.00863) (0.00851) (0.00856) (0.00774) (0.00934)
Gap (i,t-1) * MES (i,t-1) 0.00951
(0.00968)
Gap (i,t-1) * ∆CoVaR(i,t-1) 0.0308***
(0.00685)
Gap (i,t-1) * RelativeS ize(i,t-1) -0.0636***
(0.0132)
Gap (i,t-1) * S ize(i,t-1) -0.0425**
(0.0187)
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) -0.0249*** -0.0227***
(0.00904) (0.00774)
Gap (i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) -0.227*** -0.225***
(0.0258) (0.0303)
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) -0.00240
(0.0245)
Ob s ervation s 4,243 4243 4,243 4,243 4,243
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.598 0.629 0.600 0.609 0.611
P an el B: 
Gap (i,t-1) 0.213*** 0.216*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.218***
(0.00836),a (0.00837),a (0.00811),a (0.0100),a (0.0109),a
Gap (i,t-1) * MES (i,t-1) 0.0363***
(0.0101),a
Gap (i,t-1) * ∆CoVaR(i,t-1) 0.00318
(0.00952),a
Gap (i,t-1) * RelativeS ize(i,t-1) -0.00476
(0.00917),a
Gap (i,t-1) * S ize(i,t-1) -0.0119
(0.0122)
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) 0.0176** 0.0165**
(0.00718),a (0.00781),a
Gap (i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) -0.000565 -0.0148
(0.0210),a (0.0217),a
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) 0.0120
(0.0257)
Ob s ervation s 4,243 4,243 4,243 4,243 4,243
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.218 0.223 0.221 0.218 0.220
P an el C: 
Gap (i,t-1) 0.252*** 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.249*** 0.259***
(0.00934),ab (0.0112),ab (0.00968),ab (0.0112),ab (0.0109),ab
Gap (i,t-1) * MES (i,t-1) 0.0288**
(0.0130)
Gap (i,t-1) * ∆CoVaR(i,t-1) 0.0149
(0.0118)
Gap (i,t-1) * RelativeS ize(i,t-1) -0.0141
(0.0116),a
Gap (i,t-1) * S ize(i,t-1) -0.00384
(0.0132),a
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) 0.0232*** 0.0245***
(0.00774),a (0.00746),a
Gap (i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) 0.0171 0.00480
(0.0255),a (0.0275),a
Gap (i,t-1) * S IFI-in d ex(i,t-1) * Reg u latoryP res s u re(i,t-1) -0.00975
(0.0271)
Ob s ervation s 4,243 4,243 4,243 4,243 4,243
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.282 0.285 0.286 0.282 0.286
∆Leverag e
∆Tier1RW A
∆TotalCap
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Table 8: Balance sheet adjustments by SIFIs: leverage or regulatory driven? 
This table reports the coefficient estimates for the regression model (7a) in panel A and regression model (7b) in panel B. In panel C, we report an extension of regression model (7b).  
Using a sample of listed OECD banks over the 2001-2012 period, we assess the relation between the annual growth rates of diverse balance sheet items and their capital shortfall (positive 
gap, undercapitalized) or their capital surplus (negative gap, overcapitalized) vis-à-vis its target capital ratio. We jointly assess the impact of deviation from the leverage target and the 
regulatory capital target ratio. Across columns, the specification is identical except for the dependent variable, which is respectively the average annual growth rates of total common equity 
(Equity), Tier1 capital, retained earnings, total assets (Assets), risk-weighted assets (RWA), net loans (Loans), total liabilities (Liabilities), Cash and marketable securities and Liquid 
Assets. Growth rates variables are scaled by average total equity, total assets and total liabilities. The gap is computed using two definitions of capital ratio (Leverage and Tier1RWA). 
SIFI-indexi,t−1 is an aggregate systemic risk index constructed based on the quintiles of the MES, ∆CoVaR, relative size and size. All regressions include a constant term. P-values based on 
robust standard errors, are obtained following a bootstrapping procedure to account for the estimated regressors (namely, estimated capital targets are used to obtain the gaps). *, ** and*** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The letter y following the p-values indicates the cases where that coefficient is significantly different at the 10% 
significance level from its analogue (with the other capital definition) in the same panel in the same column. 
 46 
 
 
Panel A: Asymmetries in banks' capital structure adjustments
Dependent variable. Growth in: Equity Tier 1 Capital Retained Earnings Assets RWA Loans Liabilities
Cash and 
marketable 
securities Liquid Assets
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) -0.0134 -0.0907 0.108 -3.886*** 0.00169 -0.198*** -0.380*** -0.233 -0.273
(0.102) (0.105) (0.0774) (0.104) (0.0912) (0.0417) (0.0618) (0.303) (0.325)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) -0.330 -0.215 -0.573** -0.461* -0.301 -0.266** -0.349** 1.472** 2.011***
(0.267) (0.254) (0.233) (0.265) (0.213) (0.117) (0.148) (0.664) (0.768)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) 1.306*** 2.261*** 0.0883 -0.132 -0.353** -0.518*** -0.365*** 1.249** 1.491***
(0.230) (0.217) (0.177) (0.166) (0.140) (0.0919) (0.119) (0.502) (0.572)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0) 0.0984 0.234 -0.191 -0.261 -1.278*** -0.297* -0.452* -1.129 -1.857
(0.372) (0.377) (0.313) (0.269) (0.287) (0.168) (0.232) (0.906) (1.153)
SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.0606*** -0.0737*** -0.0486*** -0.0213*** -0.0542*** -0.0515*** -0.0557*** 0.0654*** 0.0570***
(0.00633) (0.00579) (0.00458) (0.00821) (0.00470) (0.00349) (0.00548) (0.0179) (0.0182)
Observations 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,230 3,081
R-squared 0.032 0.075 0.041 0.395 0.109 0.145 0.105 0.009 0.010
Number of bank_id 562 549 562 562 549 562 562 555 409
Panel B: Asymmetries and the effect of systemic importance in banks' capital structure adjustments
Dependent variable. Growth in: Equity Tier 1 Capital Retained Earnings Assets RWA Loans Liabilities
Cash and 
marketable 
securities
Liquid 
Assets
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) 0.0964 -0.0243 0.157** -4.098*** 0.0170 -0.202*** -0.371*** -0.330 -0.385
(0.0990) (0.111) (0.0781) (0.104) (0.102) (0.0432) (0.0634) (0.320) (0.340)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) -0.340 -0.230 -0.587** -0.461* -0.341* -0.257** -0.331** 1.495** 2.043***
(0.279) (0.252) (0.241) (0.251) (0.207) (0.120) (0.154) (0.677) (0.766)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.350*** -0.257** -0.173** 0.649*** -0.126 0.0324 0.0117 0.273 0.205
(0.110) (0.118) (0.0828) (0.125) (0.100) (0.0484) (0.0693) (0.286) (0.309)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.140 0.0530 0.0710 -0.515** -0.141 0.110 0.404** -0.0629 -0.231
(0.319) (0.290) (0.251) (0.238) (0.181) (0.117) (0.167) (0.687) (0.658)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) 1.169*** 2.182*** 0.0367 0.128 -0.347** -0.512*** -0.362*** 1.376*** 1.726***
(0.212),y (0.217),y (0.166) (0.158),y (0.142),y (0.0905),y (0.119) (0.497),y (0.571),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0) 0.357 0.516 -0.121 -0.844** -1.379*** -0.309* -0.415* -1.225 -1.935*
(0.385) (0.340) (0.324) (0.345) (0.260),y (0.176) (0.251) (0.900),y (1.052),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.610*** 0.0929 0.153 -0.973*** -0.194 -0.0360 -0.250** -0.739 -1.267**
(0.232),y (0.225) (0.182) (0.155),y (0.161) (0.0942) (0.117),y (0.518) (0.568),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.184 0.425 0.0357 -0.345 0.0252 -0.106 -0.208 0.0759 0.467
(0.365) (0.416) (0.299) (0.341) (0.292) (0.168) (0.247),y (1.006) (1.061)
SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.0635*** -0.0687*** -0.0479*** -0.0179** -0.0482*** -0.0522*** -0.0536*** 0.0727*** 0.0757***
(0.00835) (0.00679) (0.00468) (0.00903) (0.00568) (0.00372) (0.00567) (0.0199) (0.0241)
Observations 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,230 3,081
R-squared 0.038 0.079 0.043 0.413 0.111 0.145 0.108 0.010 0.012
Number of bank_id 562 549 562 562 549 562 562 555 409
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Panel C: Asymmetries and the effects of systemic importance and capital buffers in banks' capital structure adjustments
Dependent variable. Growth in: Equity Tier 1 Capital Retained Earnings Assets RWA Loans Liabilities
Cash and 
marketable 
securities Liquid Assets
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) 0.112 -0.00655 0.152** -4.208*** 0.0131 -0.175*** -0.336*** -0.279 -0.274
(0.0851) (0.105) (0.0726) (0.110) (0.100) (0.0432) (0.0626) (0.326) (0.334)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) -0.293 -0.0602 -0.602** -0.399 -0.332 -0.292** -0.328** 1.806** 2.722***
(0.307) (0.279) (0.281) (0.268) (0.224) (0.129) (0.165) (0.756) (0.844)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.325*** -0.227* -0.178** 0.622*** -0.145 0.0318 0.00795 0.271 0.220
(0.109) (0.117) (0.0821) (0.123) (0.0991) (0.0475) (0.0689) (0.287) (0.310)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.173 0.179 0.0535 -0.483* -0.115 0.0897 0.412** 0.246 0.366
(0.326) (0.309) (0.270) (0.261) (0.198) (0.123) (0.170) (0.759) (0.756)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)>0) * RegulatoryPressure 0.122 0.111 -0.0182 1.159*** -0.128 -0.351** -0.549** -0.540 -1.267
(0.677) (0.691) (0.461) (0.299) (0.350) (0.165) (0.215) (1.102) (1.275)
LevGap(i,t-1) * I(LevGap(i,t-1)<0) * RegulatoryPressure -0.562 -1.290* 0.191 0.504 0.129 0.0732 -0.134 -1.956 -4.119**
(0.886) (0.783) (0.795) (0.612) (0.541) (0.379) (0.516) (1.861) (1.884)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) 1.084*** 2.071*** 0.00253 0.0747 -0.115 -0.455*** -0.301** 1.945*** 2.477***
(0.206),y (0.212),y (0.162) (0.170),y (0.160) (0.0967),y (0.123) (0.604),y (0.624),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0) 0.270 0.292 -0.0124 -0.730** -1.422*** -0.269 -0.387 -1.658* -2.941***
(0.404) (0.348) (0.340) (0.363) (0.280),y (0.200) (0.269) (0.973),y (1.107),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.620*** 0.104 0.134 -0.978*** -0.156 -0.0355 -0.259** -0.611 -1.040*
(0.234),y (0.238) (0.186) (0.153),y (0.160) (0.0898) (0.112),y (0.537) (0.544),y
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) 0.173 0.318 0.0935 -0.325 -0.0347 -0.0813 -0.204 -0.240 -0.264
(0.361) (0.433) (0.296) (0.353) (0.296) (0.175) (0.248),y (1.006) (1.122)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)>0) * RegulatoryPressure -0.0429 0.0241 0.211 0.112 -0.726 -0.118 0.0176 -2.371* -2.556*
(0.834) (0.735) (0.556) (0.427),y (0.470) (0.262) (0.356) (1.411) (1.521)
Tier1Gap(i,t-1) * I(Tier1Gap(i,t-1)<0)  * RegulatoryPressure -0.848 0.527 -1.268 -1.018 0.569 -0.611 -0.182 -0.0731 5.421
(2.462) (1.774) (1.632) (1.240) (0.924) (0.816) (1.014) (3.018) (3.531),y
SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.0614*** -0.0667*** -0.0478*** -0.0193** -0.0509*** -0.0524*** -0.0542*** 0.0684*** 0.0680***
(0.00835) (0.00702) (0.00495) (0.00906) (0.00575) (0.00383) (0.00578) (0.0203) (0.0240)
Observations 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,231 4,339 4,339 4,230 3,081
R-squared 0.041 0.084 0.044 0.417 0.117 0.148 0.110 0.012 0.016
Number of bank_id 562 549 562 562 549 562 562 555 409
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Table 9: Non-linearities in the speed of adjustment: asymmetry and joint 
stance of the leverage and regulatory capital gap 
This table analyzes whether the speed of adjustment depends on the sign of the gap (i.e., is asymmetric) and whether 
the stance of the regulatory capital ratio affects the speed of adjustment of the leverage ratio (and vice versa). To that 
end, we estimate the following equation:  
k𝑖,j,𝑡 − k𝑖,j,𝑡−1 = Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ [𝛽1 ∙ 𝐼(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 > 0) + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐼(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 < 0) + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐼(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 > 0) ∙
𝐼(otherGap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 > 0) + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐼(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 < 0) ∙ 𝐼(otherGap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 > 0)]+εi,j,t  
 
I(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1>0) corresponds to the situation when bank has capital shortfall, it takes value of one if the bank’s actual 
capital is below the target capital ratio, and zero otherwise. I(Gap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1<0) corresponds to the situation when bank 
has capital surplus, is take one if the bank’s actual bank capital is above the target capital ratio, and zero otherwise. 
I(otherGap𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1>0) corresponds to the situation when bank has capital shortfall with respect to the other capital 
concept (i.e., Tier 1 capital gap in Panel A and the leverage ratio in the Panels B and C), it takes value of one if the 
bank’s actual Tier 1 capital ratio is below the target Tier 1 capital ratio, and zero otherwise. In column 1, we estimate 
a constrained version of the above equation. We show results for a sample of listed OECD banks over the 2001-2012 
period. We report results for three definitions of the capital ratio (Leverage, Tier1RWA and Total capital), 
corresponding with the three different panels A, B and C in the Table. All three equations in a column are estimated 
jointly as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions to account for possible dependencies in the residuals. P-values based on 
robust standard errors, are obtained following a bootstrapping procedure to account for the estimated regressors 
(namely, estimated capital targets are used to obtain the gaps). Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***/**/*. The letter a (b) following the p-values indicates the cases where 
that coefficient is significantly different from its analogue in panel a (b) at least at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
P an el A: ∆Leverag e
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) 0.464*** 0.515***
(0.0120) (0.0359)
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0) 0.0942*** 0.169***
(0.0190) (0.0282)
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) *  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) -0.0736*
(0.0406)
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0)*  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) -0.190***
-0.042
Ob s ervation s 4339 4339
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.332 0.334
P an el B: ∆Tier1RW A
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) 0.236*** 0.246***
(0.0136),a (0.0258),a
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0) 0.249*** 0.255***
(0.0203),a (0.0210),a
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) *  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) -0.0184
(0.0254)
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0)*  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) 0.0207
(0.0399),a
Ob s ervation s 4339 4339
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.236 0.237
P an el C: ∆TotalCap
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) 0.313*** 0.299***
(0.0188),ab (0.0234),ab
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0) 0.220*** 0.249***
(0.0232)ab (0.0260),a
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)>0) *  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) 0.0155
(0.0247),a
Gap (i,t-1) * I(Gap (i,t-1)<0)*  I(oth er Gap (i,t-1)>0) -0.0840*
(0.0502),ab
Ob s ervation s 4339 4339
Ad ju s ted  R-s q u ared 0.246 0.245
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Table 10: Speed of adjustment by SIFIs pre and post 2007  
Table shows the estimation results on the effects of systemic risk and size on bank’s adjustment speed (Eq. (6)) for a sample of 
listed OECD banks over 2001–2012 period taking into account that the effects may have changed since the onset of the global 
financial crisis starting in 2007. In panel A, we report the obtained regression coefficients. Capital gap is computed using three 
definitions of capital ratio (Leverage, Tier1RWA and Total capital), corresponding with the columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In 
all regression, 𝐷2007−2012 is a dummy takes one during crisis time (2007–2012), and zero otherwise, and SIFI-indexi,t−1 is an 
aggregate systemic risk index (SIFI-Index) constructed based on the quintiles of the MES, ∆CoVaR, relative size and size. P-
values based on robust standard errors, clustered by bank are shown in parentheses. *, ** and*** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The letter a (b) following the p-values indicates the cases where that coefficient is 
significantly different from its analogue in column 1 (2) at least at the 10% significance level. In panel B, we report the implied 
adjustment speeds in the pre and post crisis periods for small banks, average banks and SIFIs, corresponding respectively with 
cases where the standardized SIFI index takes on the value of -1, 0 and 1. 
 
Panel A: regression results
∆Leverage ∆Tier1RWA ∆Total Capital
Gap(i,t-1) 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.187***
(0.0118) -0.0108 (0.0149),b
Gap(i,t-1) * D(2007–2013) 0.224*** 0.0985*** 0.106***
(0.0165) (0.0126),a (0.0185),a
Gap(i,t-1) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) -0.0377*** -0.0213* -0.0165
(0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0121)
Gap(i,t-1) * SIFI-index(i,t-1) * D(2007–2013) 0.00656 0.0495*** 0.0486***
(0.0146) (0.0154),a (0.0157),a
Observations 4,243 4,243 4,243
Adjusted R-squared 0.618 0.228 0.291
Panel B: implied adjustment speeds
SIFI = -1 SIFI = 0 SIFI = 1
2001-2006 0.201 0.163 0.125
2007-2013 0.418 0.387 0.356
SIFI = -1 SIFI = 0 SIFI = 1
2001-2006 0.168 0.147 0.126
2007-2013 0.217 0.245 0.274
SIFI = -1 SIFI = 0 SIFI = 1
2001-2006 0.204 0.187 0.171
2007-2013 0.261 0.293 0.325
∆Leverage
∆Tier1RWA
∆Total Capital
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Appendix 
 
A1 Construction of the two systemic risk measures 
The Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) corresponds to the marginal participation of bank i to 
the Expected Shortfall (ES) of the financial system (Acharya et al. 2016 and Brownlees and 
Engle, 2012). Formally, it corresponds to the mean expected stock return for bank i, conditional 
on the market return when the latter performs poorly. Acharya et al. (2016) define the MES as 
the expectation of the bank’s equity return conditional on market crash. 
 
(A1) 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑞 ≡ 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡|𝑅𝑀,𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑀,𝑡
𝑞 ), 
where 𝑅𝑖  is one-day stock return for bank i, 𝑅𝑀 is one-day market return
12
, q is a pre-specified 
quantile and 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑀,𝑡
𝑞
 is the critical threshold equal to the p-percent quantile of the market return 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 distribution. Herewith, we take q to be equal to 5-percent, the term 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 ≤ VaRRM,t
q
 reflects 
the set of days when the market return is being at or below the worst 5-percent tail outcomes. 
The CoVaR is introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) (based on the VaR concept). 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑀|𝑖
𝑞
is the q-percent quantile of a conditional probability distribution which is written as 
13
: 
(A2) Probt−1 (RM ≤ CoVaRRM|i,t
q
 |  Ri,t = VaRRi,t
q
) = q 
 
Explicitly, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) define bank’s ∆CoVaR as the difference between 
the VaR of the financial system conditional on the firm being in distress and VaR of the system 
conditional on the bank being in its median state. It catches the externality a bank causes to the 
entire financial system. Therefore, bank ∆CoVaR is the difference between the 
                                                          
12
  We refer to the broader stock market index, as market portfolio benchmark; so as to, catch bank’s contribution to 
the economy stability.  
13 MES and ∆CoVaR are computed at time t given information available in t-1 on the financial system tail-risk. Our 
paper derives systemic risk based on two standard measures of tail risk: value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall 
(ES). Losses are expressed in positive sign. The MES and ∆CovaR are positive and given in absolute risk value. I.e. 
an increase in these bank’s systemic risk measures is thus given by a positive change. 
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CoVaRRM|i,t
q=distress state
 of the financial system when bank i is in financial distress (i.e. the bank 
stock return is at its bottom q probability level), and the CoVaRRM|i,t
q=median
 of the financial system 
when this bank i is on its median return level (i.e. the inflection point at which bank performance 
starts becoming at risk). The ∆CoVaRRM|i,t
q
 of individual bank is deﬁned as: 
 
(A3) ∆CoVaRRM|i,t
q
= CoVaRRM|i,t
q
− CoVaRRM|i,t
median 
 
MES and ∆CoVaR are computed at time t given information available in t-1 on the financial 
system tail-risk. Our paper derives systemic risk based on two standard measures of tail risk: 
value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES). Losses are expressed in positive sign. MES and 
∆CovaR are positive and given in absolute risk value. I.e. an increase in these bank’s systemic 
risk measures is thus given by a positive change 
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